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

SEPTEMBER 1919

Bulletin of the University of Georgia

Volume XIX

Number 8

Phelps-Stokes Fellowship Studies, No. 5



The Negroes of Clarke County, Georgia, During the Great War

By

FRANCIS TAYLOR LONG, A.B.,
Professor of English, Southern College,
Sutherland, Florida

Sometime Phelps-Stokes Fellow,
University of Georgia

Entered at the Post Office at Athens, Ga., as Second Class Matter, August 31, 1905.
under Act of Congress of July 16th. 1904. Issued Monthly by the University.

Serial No. 302

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
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CHANCELLOR'S FOREWORD

During the academic year 1912-13 there was established in the University of Georgia a Fellowship for the study of Negro problems in the South. The resolution of the Trustees of the Phelps-Stokes Fund in creating the Fellowship reads as follows:

"Whereas, Miss Caroline Phelps Stokes in establishing the Phelps-Stokes Fund was especially solicitous to assist in improving the condition of the negro, and

"Whereas, It is the conviction of the Trustees that one of the best methods of forwarding this purpose is to provide means to enable southern youth of broad sympathies to make a scientific study of the negro and of his adjustment to American civilization,

"Resolved, That twelve thousand five hundred dollars (\$12,500) be given to the University of Georgia for the permanent endowment of a research fellowship, on the following conditions:

"1. The University shall appoint annually a Fellow in Sociology, for the study of the Negro. He shall pursue advanced studies under the direction of the departments of Sociology, Economics, Education or History, as may be determined in each case by the Chancellor. The Fellowship shall yield \$500, and shall, after four years, be restricted to graduate students.

"2. Each Fellow shall prepare a paper or thesis embodying the result of his investigations which shall be published by the University with assistance from the income of the fund, any surplus remaining being applicable to other objects incident to the main purpose of the Fellowship. A copy of these resolutions shall be incorporated in every publication issued under this foundation.

"3. The right to make all necessary regulations, not inconsistent with the spirit and letter of these resolutions, is given to the Chancellor and Faculty, but no changes in the conditions of the foundation can be made without the mutual consent both of the Trustees of the University and of the Phelps-Stokes Fund."

I appointed as Fellow under this foundation for the year 1918-19 Mr. Frank T. Long, A.B., a graduate of Mercer University in the Class of 1904, and placed the work under the direction of Professor R. P. Brooks, of the department of History. The present study is published in pursuance of the requirement in the second condition attached to the Fellowship.

DAVID C. BARROW,
Chancellor, University of Georgia.

PREFACE

In this study I have attempted to follow up the previous investigations of the negro problem conducted under the auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fellowship at the University of Georgia by inquiring into the spirit and attitude of the negroes of Clarke County during the Great War. If the study lacks depth and breadth of basic material, I hope its timeliness will in some degree atone for any deficiency of this kind. The greater part of the time from November 15, 1918 to June 4, 1919, was used in the direct and careful investigation of all sources of information available. Despite the difficulties that confront everyone who gathers data from sources where the records of whites and blacks are not kept separate, I have endeavored to learn in each case the definite facts and to confine myself strictly and impartially to them. In the case of interviews I invariably visited a sufficient number of persons in each instance to be sure that the opinions as finally recorded were vitally representative, many interviews similar to those included in the study being omitted.

It is with many thanks that I acknowledge the aid of numerous helpers, both members of the faculty of the University of Georgia and others, in the compilation of this thesis. I wish in this way to express my gratitude to Chancellor David C. Barrow, through whose suggestion the subject was chosen and by whom a lively interest has been manifested throughout the investigation; to Professor R. P. Brooks, whose wise and skilled guidance directed the research practically from its inception; to Professor H. D. Dozier for early encouragement and suggestions; to Professor H. A. Inghram for invaluable aid in the compilation of statistics; to Professor and Mrs. C. J. Heatwole for much inspiration and general aid; to Mr. W. T. Forbes, secretary of the Athens Y. M. C. A., and his assistant, Miss Annie Foster, for patient and most helpful information concerning war activity campaigns; to Miss Corinne Gerdine for unfailing assistance with reference to Red Cross statistics; to Mr. W. Woods White, of Atlanta, for much helpful statistical material, and to many others who have encouraged me and have given me practical aid.

FRANCIS TAYLOR LONG.

Athens, Ga., June 4, 1919.

CHAPTER I.

OPERATION OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

By general consent man-power is regarded as the first requisite in time of war, for without recruits from whom to select and train both the officers and the men of an army, other resources, no matter how varied or how inexhaustible, amount to little. It is, therefore, proper to begin this study of war conditions in Clarke County with a consideration of the response made by the negroes of the county under the requirements of the selective service system. In the consideration of this, as is true in the examination of practically every other phase of the study, the parallel contribution of the whites is always in the background and insistently presents itself for comparison. The comparative basis of study will, consequently, be employed freely, because there is no better way in which to show clearly the sharp contrasts which are so often discovered in the analysis of this question. The registration statistics, the only reliable basis for a contrast between the man-power contributions of the two races to the direct military activity of the nation, are presented, first, in detailed form for information; second, in consolidated form for comparison.

TABLE I.

Registration of June, 1917¹

	Number Registered	Inductions	Delinquents	Deserters
White	1,028	187	10	1
Black	992	331	64	8

TABLE II.

Registration of June and August, 1918

	Number Registered	Inductions	Delinquents	Deserters
White	68	17	1	0
Black	60	23	0	0

TABLE III.

Registration of September, 1918

	Number Registered	Inductions	Delinquents	Deserters
White	1,369	58	13	0
Black	960	6	49	0

TABLE IV.

Showing a Consolidation of the Registration

	Number Registered	Inductions	Delinquents	Deserters
White	2,465	262	24	1
Black	2,012	360	113	8

For a full and clear understanding of the significance of these tables certain explanations are necessary. The excess of black inductions over white is due to (1) the considerable number of whites

¹ These statistics were secured from the Clarke County Local Board.

who volunteered and are not included in these figures; and (2) the fact that the negroes are not evenly distributed over the country but are concentrated in the South. In order, therefore, that the negroes might be made to bear their proportionate part of the burden, it was necessary to call a larger number from the South than would on the surface seem just. The Local Board in calling up whites and blacks acted on orders from the Provost Marshal General at Washington, who designated in his orders the number of each race he desired.

Delinquents are those who failed to make out questionnaires or to appear for physical examination. Such cases are reported to the Adjutant General of the State. The Adjutant General then mails a notice to the delinquent, requiring him to show cause why he should not be inducted. If he does not report within a certain number of days, he is then automatically inducted and his name is sent to the Adjutant General of the United States. He is then classed as a deserter. This is the only class of deserters handled by the local boards. The local boards have nothing to do with the men who desert after induction.

In the registration for September, 1918, the large number of delinquents is due to the fact that in sending out questionnaires, the young men eighteen years of age were included with those who were thirty-seven years old and with all the men who came within the age limit of the registration. Subsequently the men who were thirty-seven years old, as well as those who were older, were relieved from making out questionnaires, that is to say, the questionnaires were recalled after the signing of the armistice. This brought about confusion, because the young men who were eighteen years of age, in a number of cases, interpreted the recall as applying to themselves also. If the registration had been completed (the armistice stopped it), there would probably have been only five delinquents, of whom four would have been negroes. The relatively large number of white inductions in the September, 1918, registration, is accounted for by the fact that most of these were members of the Student Army Training Corps at the University of Georgia.

It is necessary, in order to see more clearly the relationship between the number of white and the negro registrants, that the population of the two races be compared.

TABLE V¹.
Showing Population of the County by Races

	Population	Percentage
White - - - - -	11,502	49.3
Black - - - - -	11,767	50.7

On the basis of population it is evident from this table that the negroes should have furnished somewhat more men for the army

¹ Abstract of the Thirteenth Census, p. 608.

than the whites, because the negro population of the county is a little more than fifty per cent of the total population. But there is a notably larger number of white registrants than black. From this it would appear that there is a larger number of white people in Clarke County now than black. This is doubtless true and will account in some degree but not altogether for the great difference. The other probable causes of this difference will be considered in the analysis of the table which gives a comparison between the population and the registration of the two races.

TABLE VI.

Showing a Comparison of Population and Registration

	Population by races.	Registration by races.	Percentage of each race reg- istered.	Percentage of each registra- tion induced.	Percentage of each registra- tion delin- quents.	Percentage of each registra- tion deserters.
White - - - - -	11,502	2,465	21.51	2.27	0.21	.009
Black - - - - -	11,767	2,012	17.09	3.07	0.96	.07

An examination of this table shows that the negroes, though slightly more numerous, failed considerably in even equaling the number of registrants furnished by the whites, the registration of blacks having fallen 453 short of whites. At first thought it would seem that this surplus of white registrants is due to the student population in the Student Army Training Corps of the University of Georgia, but a more thorough examination of the matter fails to justify this opinion. In the first place, two of the registrations, the ones for August and September, 1918, took place when the University was not in session. Consequently there was no non-resident student population in the city. In the second place, the non-resident students who registered at the University during the other two registration periods, according to the registrar of the University, who was officially appointed by the Local Board to register these students, invariably registered with their home boards by having the registrar send their cards to the local boards of the towns and cities in which they lived. In the opinion of the registrar there was not one exception in the approximately 125 students whom he registered. Even if all of this number were subtracted from the 453 surplus white registrants there would still be a surplus of 328, which is out of all proportion to the percentage of population.

There are three probable explanations of this unusual majority of white registrants. In the first place, as has already been indicated, it is doubtless caused in part by the more rapid increase of white than black population in the present decade. According to the census of 1910, there were a few more blacks than whites in Clarke

County, thereby causing it to remain by a slight majority in the Black Belt. It is very likely true now that there is a majority of whites. In the second place, this increase of white population seems to have been accentuated by negro migration, which has been marked since the outbreak of the Great War. While the migration of negroes to munitions and other plants of a similar nature has not affected all of the county, it seems to have affected the city of Athens to a marked degree. Practically all of the men who migrated were of such ages as would come within the limits specified in the selective service laws. In the third place, it seems that the broadening educational advantages offered by the University of Georgia are increasing not only the non-resident but the permanent white population of the city. Parents who are in a position to do so are more and more coming to Athens to reside permanently in order that their sons and daughters may enjoy the educational advantages thus afforded. There is no corresponding school here for the negroes. The negro schools in Athens are of a kind to attract students who are too young to come within the age of registration. Doubtless each of these causes has aided in bringing about the difference noted in the white and the black registration.

Other phases of the comparison are likewise invariably in favor of the whites. The number of the white registrants exceeds that of the black by 4.42 per cent. The number of registrants inducted is greater by .8 of one per cent for the blacks than for the whites. The delinquency of black registrants is greater by .75 of one per cent than that of the white, and the number of deserters, though remarkably small for each race, is greater by .06 of one per cent for the blacks than for the whites.

If a further analysis of the service rendered by these recruits were made, it would doubtless be discovered that many of the negroes were employed in the less responsible work of the army, such as that of labor battalions and kindred service, work, however, which is just as essential to the army as that of the infantrymen. There were, of course, far more officers commissioned from among the white recruits than from the black. All of the negro recruits received several months of training in the various army camps, and some of them went to France and saw active service at the front. Judging from the general character of the negroes of Clarke County, the negroes who entered the army from Athens measured up well with the average of the soldiers of their race. As soldiers they doubtless rendered as good service as the average negro soldiers did in the army.

CHAPTER II.

RECORDS OF VARIOUS WAR ACTIVITY CAMPAIGNS

After an examination of the man-power contribution made by the negroes of Clarke County during the Great War it is well to turn next to the contribution of funds for the training and support of these men in the field. These two things, the army and the material support of the army, are invariably thought of together. There is a *tertium quid*, the very essence of patriotism, the spirit without which neither an army nor the resources for the support of the army are possible; but for the purposes of this paper the presence of this spirit will be gauged in a practical way by the presence or absence of a concrete manifestation of it in one or both of the two first named elements. As the army and the resources of the army are so necessarily linked together, the consideration of the second of these two component parts will form the basis of this chapter. The contrast between the respective contributions of the two races in this phase of war work, as will be shown more in detail later in the chapter, is indeed sharp and well defined. Probably few other comparisons in this study, if any at all, will show greater divergence than this. Though at best little could be expected of the negroes in this particular, even that little has not been realized.

Before consideration is given to the contributions of war funds by the whites and blacks, the relationship between the amount of property owned by the members of the two races, which is the economic basis and source of these funds, will first be shown. In order to present these differences as fully and as clearly as possible, recourse has been had to the Tax Digest of Clarke County, which offers the most dependable statistics available. Only a few of the items listed in the consolidation found in the Tax Digest have been omitted, these items being the ones in which no comparison can be made because there are no figures given for the negroes. No important item, however, has been left out. This rather complete survey of items is given so that all the important forms of property may be compared at a glance, but careful comparisons will be made only with reference to the most important items.

TABLE VII.
Showing Tax Valuation by Races of Main Articles of Property

	No. of Acres of Land.	Aggregate Market Value of Real Estate, Including Buildings Thereon.	Aggregate Market Value of City or Town Property.	Amount of Money and Debts of all Kinds, Including Notes, Accounts, Etc.	Market Value of Merchandise of Every Kind, Including Freights, Fixtures, Fertilizers for Sale.	Market Value of Automobiles, Motorcycles and Bicycles.	Market Value of Household and Kitchen Furniture, Pianos, Organs, Lamps, Pictures, Etc.	Market Value of Jewelry, Watches, Silver Plate of All Kinds.	Market Value of Horses, Mules, Hogs, Sheep, Cattle, and All Other Stock.	Market Value of Carriages, Wagons, Buggies, Plantation and Mechanical Tools.	Aggregate Value of Whole Property.
White -	61447.25	\$1487825	\$6388520	\$1732280	\$1435335	\$237450	\$501770	\$533785	\$154240	\$30025	\$13621305
Black -	9024.50	182033	416730	1925	5565	14875	70400	300	66110	7520	765765
Total -	70471.75	\$1669860	\$6805250	\$1734305	\$1440900	\$272325	\$572170	\$54085	\$220350	\$37545	\$14387070

TABLE VIII.
Showing Percentage of Total of Each Item of Property Owned by Each Race

White -	87.14	89.09	94.76	99.89	99.68	94.54	98.77	99.45	70.00	79.97	94.61
Black -	12.86	10.91	5.24	0.11	0.32	5.46	1.23	0.55	30.00	20.03	5.39

¹ Tax Digest, Clarke County, 1918.

In this decided preponderance in the value of the property of the whites, which is shown in figures in each phase of the itemized statement of tax valuations in the foregoing table, is to be found an indication of the degree to which the contributions of the whites surpass those of the negroes. Several items are entirely omitted from the tabulation, because in these items no basis of comparison is given. That is, no figures at all are given for the negroes. Among these items are "the market value of shares in any state or national bank of this state, etc.," and "the market value of cotton, corn, annual crops, provisions, etc." Relative to the first of these items, market value of shares in any state or national bank of this state, the whites of the county are credited with the return of shares to the amount of \$834,000. The property of the whites noted in the second of these items is returned at \$35,405. These statistics are offered without further comment.

Selecting from this detailed array of statistics four items that are probably the most representative, a comparison will be made within this more restricted and more vital range of the relative ownership of property by the two races. In the matter of land, for instance, it will be observed that the whites own 87.14 per cent, while the blacks own 12.86 per cent of the total. This means that the whites own about six and three-quarters acres of land to every acre owned by the negroes. In the value of this land the whites have additional advantage, for the total valuation of the land of the whites is a little more than eight times that of the blacks. If one were, therefore, to compare the war contribution of the whites with that of the blacks on the sole basis of the valuation of land owned in the county, the ratio would be established.

If the aggregate value of the total property of the whites is considered with that of the blacks, the contrast is even more unfavorable to the negro; for the value of the total property of the whites is somewhat more than seventeen times as much as that of the negroes. This epitome of the most prominent points shown in the preceding tables prepares the way for the consideration of the part the negroes of the county played in the support of the war activity campaigns.

Complete responsibility for the raising of all the popular funds connected with war activities—Liberty Loan, Red Cross, War Savings Stamps, United War Work, and all the other related efforts—was assumed by the whites. All the organizations for this work were originated by the whites and were placed in operation by them. It was understood that the whites would raise the quota asked for in each instance. If the aid of the negroes could be secured, it was well. If the negroes gave no aid in any particular campaign, the whites thought nothing of it but went ahead and subscribed the entire fund. If any of the white subscribers failed to pay, other white subscribers took up these pledges and paid them. If any

negro subscribers failed to pay—and they did fail in nearly every instance to pay all they pledged even in the few campaigns in which they took part—the whites also made good these pledges. It was the white man's burden, and the white man bore it in Clarke County cheerfully and most successfully.

At the outset one is confronted by the fact that the negroes contributed nothing to some of these campaigns. An examination of the list of the fourteen campaigns which will be made the basis of this chapter discloses the fact that there were as many as seven of these, fifty per cent of the total, in which the negroes took no part. In some cases there are extenuating circumstances for this remissness of the blacks; in others there are none. It is true, for instance, that in some of these phases of war activity the negroes were not asked to take part, because some of the campaigns were conducted so rapidly and so successfully that the results aimed at were obtained even before more than a very few of the whites had been canvassed, or because a rapid and enthusiastic canvass of the whites insured the success of the given campaign without an appeal being made directly to the negro population. The prosecution of the First Liberty Loan is an example of the former of these two conditions; the Food Conservation Campaign is an example of the latter¹. But the fact cannot be well escaped that even when vigorous canvasses were made of the negroes in the more important campaigns that the response received from them was not enthusiastic. No demands were made upon the negroes in some of the later campaigns, not because the whites were not anxious for the coöperation and help of the negroes; but because the organizers of these campaigns had already learned that much energy was wasted to secure a few pledges among the negroes and that in every campaign the greater part of the pledges made remained unpaid. The response of the negroes as a whole to these concrete demands of patriotism may be characterized as disappointing, not only with reference to the negro subscriptions themselves but also as regards the comprehension by the negroes of the increased moral and spiritual responsibility placed upon them by the war.

It has been observed oftener than once by leaders, both white and colored, in the war activity campaign work among the negroes in Clarke County that the zeal and enthusiasm with which the negroes began the consideration of a subscription varied much from the final results that were obtained. The amount of their pledges did not equal the fervor of their emotional enthusiasm. Their interest was apparently easily aroused, but it manifested a tendency to subside just as quickly. This serves to explain in part why even when they finally enlisted in these campaigns their contributions were so pathetically insignificant. It doubtless serves also as a partial explanation of why there were so many war activity campaigns in which the negroes did not participate at all.

¹ See Table IX and the explanation following it.

TABLE IX.

**Showing Summary of War Activity Campaigns in Which Negroes
Did Not Participate**

Campaign	Amt. Subscribed	No. Subs.	Ave. Sub.
First Liberty Loan -	\$357,200.00	(Not available)	
Second Liberty Loan -	266,000.00	759	\$350.45
First Y. M. C. A.			
War Work - - -	11,860.00	638	18.59
Second Y. M. C. A.			
War Work - - -	32,452.61	(See explanation below)	
Second Red Cross -	33,000.00	2,200	15.00
Armenian and Syrian			
War Relief - - -	6,282.81	862	7.29
Food Conservation—97 per cent of white people of Athens pledged in one day. Negroes were not solicited.			

In securing accurate and complete statistics for Tables IX and X much difficulty was experienced. This was due to several causes, two of which should be mentioned. In the first place, it was found that in nearly every instance white and black subscriptions, if kept separate at all, were often confused in final tabulations made by the leaders of these campaigns. It may, therefore, be that some small subscriptions made by negroes to some one or more of the foregoing campaigns have been overlooked. In the second place, on account of the fact that many of these pledges are paid in instalments extending over rather long periods, some of the subscribers fail to complete the payment of their pledges even after having made some of the payments. Consequently the totals are being constantly revised and corrected. In either instance, however, any inaccuracies that may have occurred would not appreciably change the ultimate results.

In further explanation of the fact that the negroes did not contribute to any of these campaigns it may be said with reference to the First Liberty Loan that this campaign for funds was not only about the first one instituted but also that it was restricted almost entirely to the banks and various corporations of the city of Athens. Most of the subscriptions to each of the Liberty Loans were made in Athens, but the four succeeding loans were better distributed throughout the county than the First. The fact that the bulk of the subscriptions in each of the loans came from the city is natural, because Athens is not only the one city in Clarke County but also represents a great amount of the county's population and wealth. It may be readily seen that in the First Liberty Loan the number of subscribers was small in comparison, for instance, with the Second Liberty Loan, or with any other loan of the series.

It will be observed, however, that the Second Liberty Loan was a more general loan than the First. It came considerably later in point of time, and much greater enthusiasm in the prosecution of the war had been aroused than had characterized the first loan of

the series. More publicity was given to it, as will be manifest from a glance at that part of the foregoing table which shows the number of subscribers, 759. Yet there is no record of a single negro subscription to this loan.

Two of the three large Y. M. C. A. campaigns for funds had been completed before the negroes made any subscription to this worthy cause. The fact that almost as many subscribers participated in the First Y. M. C. A. campaign as in the Second Liberty Loan will serve to show how general was the solicitation made for funds in that campaign. The large number of subscribers who contributed to the Second Y. M. C. A. campaign gives adequate indication of the widespread nature of the appeal in that campaign in Clarke County; for, excluding the War Savings Stamps and the United War Work campaigns, no other organized effort of this nature secured such an individual response.

In Table IX the figures given for the amount subscribed for the Second Y. M. C. A. War Work Campaign represent the total for the Athens District, composed of several counties, and not of Clarke County. On account of the fact that Athens oversubscribed so heavily its quota in the First Y. M. C. A. War Work Campaign, no canvass for funds was made in Clarke County at all but the remaining counties of the district were left to make up their just subscriptions to this fund. The only part of this amount that should be credited to Clarke County is \$250 voluntarily sent in to the fund by a large public service corporation of Athens. Consequently no number of subscribers is given with the amount subscribed as listed in the table.

In the foregoing table is given a resumé of what may be termed the negative phase of the activity of the negroes in Clarke County in the war work campaigns. This is a negative consideration of the matter, because the number of campaigns in which the negroes did not take part made it seem necessary to present this phase of the matter before taking up the positive achievement. Without dwelling too much on these negative statistics, a more complete examination will now be made of the positive side.

TABLE X.

Showing Summary of War Activity Campaigns in Which Negroes Participated

Campaign	Amt. Subscribed	No. Subs.	Ave. Sub.
First Red Cross—			
White - - - - \$	30,117	1,262	\$ 23.87
Black - - - -	1,201	1,684	.72
Third Liberty Loan—			
White - - - -	805,000	1,800	447.22
Black - - - -	600	12	50.00
Fourth Liberty Loan—			
White - - - -	1,151,350	1,782	646.10
Black - - - -	4,150	34	122.06
Fifth Liberty Loan—			
White - - - -	779,100	673	1157.65
Black - - - -	750	2	325.00
War Savings Stamps—			
White - - - -	274,000	3,700	74.06
Black - - - -	9,995	379	26.36
United War Work—			
White - - - -	67,175.15	5,077	13.23
Black - - - -	1,268.85	739	1.72
Jewish War Relief—			
White - - - -	14,925	350	42.64
Black - - - -	75	(Not available)	

There are some interesting conditions presented in this table. With reference to the data for the two Red Cross Campaigns, it will be observed that only one of the two is presented in this tabulation. The statistics for the other one are to be found in the preceding table. The figures for the First Red Cross Campaign show that the whites subscribed twenty-five times as much as the negroes. The comparison of the value of the total property of the two races, it will be recalled, showed that the whites owned seventeen times as much property as the blacks. There were 422 more colored subscribers than white, and the average subscription for the blacks was only one thirty-third of that for the whites.

With reference to the Third Liberty Loan, the first loan of the series in which the negroes of Clarke County participated, it will be seen that the whites subscribed 1,342 times as much as the blacks, and that this large white subscription was divided among 1,788 more subscribers than for the negroes. It is only the fact that merely a dozen negroes subscribed to this loan that make the average subscription for the negroes compare with that of the whites as \$50 to \$447.22. The contrast here is indeed very unfavorable for the negroes, for it shows that only a few of the wealthiest negroes took part in the campaign. Almost the entire negro population took no part whatever, while the white population as a whole was fairly well represented.

In the Fourth Liberty Loan the negroes made the most creditable

showing in the entire series of loans. It appears that the several preceding campaigns were necessary in order to arouse the negroes to sufficient permanent enthusiasm for them to register their patriotism in a concrete way in the Liberty Loans. It is also true that, as the Liberty Loans called for sums of not less than fifty dollars from individuals, in case of individual subscriptions, they were not suited to the financial circumstances of the negroes; but as the loans proceeded it was found that more subscriptions were secured from negro churches, schools and similar organizations. This, together with the fact that the negroes gradually gained more confidence and interest in the loans and were at the same time able to foresee the end of the war, doubtless helps to explain the gradual but perceptible increase in negro subscriptions. Though the Fourth Liberty Loan called for an increase over the Third Loan of about only a third of the total amount of the latter loan, the negroes increased their share to where it was nearly seven times as large as their contribution to the Third Liberty Loan. There was a gratifying increase also in the number of negro subscribers to this loan, in which the total amount subscribed by the negroes was about one-two hundred and seventy-fifth part of the amount subscribed by the whites. The average negro subscription was about one-fifth that of the white.

Without even more than a casual examination of the question at issue one would regard the War Savings Stamps Campaign as the opportunity in this kind of war activity that ought to have proved by its very nature the most democratic and representative, especially among the negroes. This may have been true, but the statistics do not show it; for it is very likely true in many instances that the subscription, for instance, of a school with several hundred pupils was entered and counted as one subscription. Investments in Thrift Stamps, as they were known, could be made in as small sums as twenty-five cents. This ought to have put them in the reach of a majority of people, even among the negroes. It is but natural to conclude, then, that this fund was of all war funds the one most widely distributed among individuals; but there is no way in which this may be definitely established by figures.

A further examination of Table X is interesting in this connection. The table shows that there were almost twice as many negro subscriptions to the United War Work Campaigns as to the War Savings Stamps fund, while more than twice as many subscriptions are credited to the First Red Cross Campaign as to the United War Work. In each of these three campaigns subscriptions were made by schools, churches, etc., so that it is very likely that some of these subscriptions that embraced many subscribers were entered as single subscriptions. The fact that the complete amount secured from negro subscriptions in the War Savings Stamps Campaign is about eight times as large as that of the total subscriptions by the negroes

to either the United War Work or the First Red Cross fund may be an indication that there were more actual, individual subscribers to this fund than to either of the other two, but this would not necessarily result. The War Savings Stamps Campaign was largely a business matter; but the contributions to the Red Cross and United War Work funds were charitable, as no direct returns were expected from these latter contributions. It may have been necessary to secure the total negro subscription to the First Red Cross Campaign in very small amounts from the large number of subscribers, 1,684, while, on account of the investment feature, the much larger total negro subscription to the War Savings Stamps Campaign could have been more easily secured from the 379 subscribers. It seems very likely that this latter condition prevailed and that the War Savings Stamps fund was not the most widely distributed war fund among the blacks, among whom it appears from the property comparison it should have been far more generally distributed than among the whites, especially since such comparatively small amounts were subscribed by the negroes to the various Liberty Loans. Evidence to some degree corroborative of this may be found in the following table:

TABLE XI¹.

Showing Percentage of Negro Population Taking Part in War Savings Stamps Campaign

County	No. of Population, Black	Percentage of Population, Black	Percentage of Population Pledging	Number of Pledges	Amt. Pledged
Clarke - - -	11,767	50.6	5	379	\$9,995
Bryan - - -	3,337	49.8	1	28	225
Morgan - - -	13,414	68.0	98	3,353	147,058

It will be seen from this table that Clarke County is included with the two other counties of the state which represent, respectively, the lowest and the highest percentage of negro population contributing to the War Savings Stamps Campaign. In connection with the foregoing statistics it should be remembered that the estimated average for the state of the percentage of negroes contributing to the fund is 20 per cent. It may be seen from this that Clarke County falls very much below the average, as only five per cent of the negro population of this county contributed to the fund. With reference to the number of negroes in these counties under consideration, it may be seen that Morgan, with its black popula-

¹ Figures used in this table were obtained from the State Director, War Savings Stamps Campaign, Atlanta, and from *Abstract of the Thirteenth Census*.

tion of 13,414, has only 1,647 more negroes than Clarke County but that in both the number of blacks pledging and in the amount of these subscriptions in dollars the former county has far surpassed the latter. There were nearly nine times as many subscribers in Morgan County as in Clarke, and these subscribers pledged nearly fifteen times as much as the Clarke County negroes. This is out of all proportion also to the property owned and shows that the Clarke County negroes, despite their excellent advantages as regards schools and churches, failed to come up to the standard of a county which they themselves would consider inferior to their own county in point of general rank.

In the complete report of the War Savings Stamps Campaign for the negroes of Georgia¹ it is found that the percentage of negroes pledging money to this fund varied in the different counties of the state from 1 per cent to 98 per cent, with the average about 20 per cent. From this it is manifest that the Clarke County negroes have fallen below the average in the percentage of the race subscribing to the fund. Here is found also rather conclusive evidence that the pledges to this fund were not the most widely distributed of the war activity campaigns. Further evidence is also discovered in the circumstances which governed the organization of this campaign in Clarke County. From an authoritative opinion expressed relative to this it is very probable that the failure of this campaign with reference to the distribution of the pledges and the total amount subscribed was caused by a lack of the most aggressive organization, due in part, at least, to local opposition to the separate organization of the campaign for the negroes in Clarke County.

It is interesting to observe that, of the entire fourteen war activity campaigns considered in this study, those listed in Table X were the ones that were better organized than the others. It is interesting, furthermore, to note that of these seven campaigns some were better organized than others, as was indicated at the conclusion of the foregoing paragraph. The First Red Cross Campaign was thoroughly organized, and an active canvass of the negroes was made, the results of which have already been analyzed. It was frankly admitted, however, by the man who was practically the director of the campaign in Clarke County that the results obtained from so much hard work were so disappointing that no effort at all was made to solicit subscriptions from the negroes during the Second Red Cross Campaign.

Committees from among the whites canvassed the negroes in the Third, Fourth and Fifth Liberty Loans, though there was little need of it in the Fifth Liberty Loan on account of the unusual ease and rapidity with which that campaign, as was also true in the First Liberty Loan, was conducted. As has already been suggested, the

¹ This report was consolidated in the headquarters of the campaign in Atlanta by Mr. W. Woods White, the director.

War Savings Stamps and the United War Work Campaigns were organized centrally for the entire state from Atlanta, both of these campaigns having been under the supervision of Mr. W. Woods White, of that city, who made use of the most compact and carefully planned system that was employed in any of the war activity campaigns among the negroes in this state.

It was the purpose of Mr. White in organizing these campaigns to make use of the most important institutions among the negroes and to organize about them machinery for the solicitation of pledges. Taking the church as the leading one of these institutions, he linked with it the school and the lodge. These three organizations summarize the religious, educational and fraternal elements in the life of the negro. Mr. White, therefore, in naming his committees for the various counties in the state, placed upon the committee for each county the leaders in the religious, educational and fraternal life of that county. In this way he believes that he made the organizations for the War Savings Stamps and the United War Work Campaigns among the negroes as thorough and as effective as possible. Under this arrangement all the workers employed in the conduct of the campaign in each county were negroes. They were given constant supervision and advice by their white friends in the headquarters for Georgia in Atlanta, but the work was essentially the work of the negroes themselves. This was a notable example of the stimulation of racial pride and unity by helping the negroes to help themselves, a principle in which Mr. White firmly believes.

It should be remembered that even in the excellent organization of these two campaigns, the War Savings Stamps and the United War Work, that they were organized among the negroes several months after similar organizations had been perfected among the whites. It is but natural to suppose that this was a disadvantage to the negro, but it is well to consider two racial tendencies among negroes that might form a basis for a different conclusion. The first of these two traits is that the negro is by nature an imitator, the second is that the negro's enthusiasm is easily aroused but just as easily disappears. In considering the first of these traits it is possible for one to perceive that the whites in their leadership in both the organization of the campaigns and in their subscription to these funds might stimulate and helpfully influence the negroes. In the consideration of the principle upon which the second trait is based, it may be seen that, as there was less time intervening between the period of the making of the pledges and the time of payment of them, the zeal and enthusiasm of the negroes would have less time to become cold and inactive. This comment is offered for what it may be worth. It seems more natural and probable, however, to think that with earlier organizations perfected among the negroes and with more thorough and more general solicitation, which even

in this case would have been stimulated and aided by the example of the whites, there would have been more favorable results from the campaigns.

There is little doubt, however, that the negro has failed to realize other than to a slight degree the larger responsibilities of citizenship and patriotism. This is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that only a part of the fund subscribed by the negroes in the United War Work Campaign has been paid. Diligent efforts have been made both by the chairman of the negro committee in charge of the work in Clarke County and by the negro secretary of the United War Work Campaign in Atlanta to collect this money. These negro leaders seem to realize fully the responsibility incurred by themselves and by the members of their race in pledging this money, but even from the beginning of the campaign many of the negro subscribers have not so regarded their pledges and they have less regard for their obligations than ever, now that the war has ended. A well known and reliable Athens negro, in speaking of the failure of the negroes to redeem their pledges, said: "It was hard work to get even as much of the money as we were able to collect before the war closed, but it is harder than ever to get it now. Very little has been gotten since last November. When I ask them why they don't pay what they promised, they always say that they don't see any need of paying it now that the war is over." The negro supervisor for the state of the same campaign, whose headquarters are in Atlanta and who has been intimately acquainted with the conditions in the Clarke County work in this campaign, spoke in similar manner of the situation in Clarke County; but he also declared that he was determined to collect the Clarke County pledges if it were possible to do so. "I consider it little short of a calamity for the members of my race to make pledges of this kind in the time of the great need of this money in war work and then not to keep their pledges. We intend to collect the pledges if we can and to impress upon the negroes the importance of such obligations." Finally the white director of practically all the war activity campaigns in Clarke County corroborates the facts brought out by the negro leaders in the following words: "We have practically discarded consideration of the negro as a factor in these campaigns since our earlier experience with them in this work. It takes much work to get them to pledge even a little, and the work isn't worth the trouble; for it leaves apparently no permanently good effect upon them. In all the campaigns in the county in which the negroes have taken part, I estimate that they will pay about one-fourth of what they pledged. That is about what they have already paid, and they are not going to pay any more. What little they did pay amounts almost to nothing."

No more valuable comments upon the negro's part in the war activity campaigns in Clarke County have been made than these

three that have just been quoted. The two from the negro leaders are indications from the members of their own race of the lack of genuine depth in the patriotic emotions of the negroes of the county during the Great War. They, as did their white brothers, wished to aid by contribution of funds in the prosecution of the war, but they were too weak racially to live up to their obligations. The defect in the negro's character which is the cause of this failure is well expressed by a keen and sympathetic interpreter of the negro in the following words: "Another element of contradiction in the character of the negro is an alert imitativeness associated with the most wonderful persistency in conforming to the real bent of his nature. He is eager to ape the habits and customs of the whites, and yet reveals in his own infirmities that he is incapable of adopting anything but the form."¹

¹ Bruce, Philip A. *The Plantation Negro as a Freeman*, p. 134.

CHAPTER III.

WAR ACTIVITIES IN THE SCHOOLS

It will be recalled that in Chapter II of this study reference was made to the organization of the War Savings Stamps and the United War Work Campaigns among the negroes of the state, these campaigns having been organized in such a way as to make a three-fold appeal to the negroes through prominent and influential representatives of three of their most vital institutions, the church, the lodge, the school. In this manner these campaigns in their religious, fraternal and educational associations came to have definite appeals for the negroes. An interesting three-fold comparison could be made in this connection between the war activity work of these three institutions among the negroes as compared with the same organizations among the whites. Space will be used, however, for only one of these comparisons, that of the negro and the white schools. The reason is that two of these institutions among the negroes occupy more prominent places in their general appeal than they do among the whites. The church and the lodge supply a much greater social field for the blacks than they do for the whites, and both the church and the lodge organizations are made use of for different purposes in the lives of the negroes from what they are among the whites.

Though both white churches and fraternal organizations invested in Liberty Bonds, yet it was not as characteristic and as representative a matter with them as with the corresponding negro organizations. One white church alone in Athens invested \$5,000 in Liberty Bonds, a sum which in itself was more than all the negroes of the county invested in the Fourth Liberty Loan—the loan of all the entire series of five to which the negroes subscribed most liberally,—and equal to the total investment of all the negroes of Clarke County in all of the Liberty Loans. Consequently it is evident from this brief consideration of the white churches that they invested in these loans more liberally than did the negro organizations. The same thing is true of the white fraternal organizations as compared with the black. As the functions of these two organizations vary so much among whites and black, it seems best that the comparison be restricted to the other institution mentioned, the school. It is fortunately true that a more definite comparison of results can be obtained in the war activities of the schools of the two races.

This chapter will, consequently, be employed as a medium for the presentation of as complete a comparison as possible of war activities as they were carried out in the white and the black schools of the county. It may be seen at a glance that all of the war activity campaigns would not have an equal appeal for the pupils in the schools. The Liberty Loan bonds, for instance, were in such large

denominations as to make the purchase of them by the children, except in rare cases, practically impossible. These exceptions are invariably where pupils of schools as organizations and not as individual pupils combined their contributions to buy a bond for some definite purpose.

In the case of the War Savings Stamps Campaign the appeal was practically universal. There were two good reasons for this. On the one hand, Thrift Stamps, as they were called, could be bought in such small denominations as to make them accessible virtually to every pupil: on the other hand, the buying of these stamps was not a charity but an investment. The pupils were easily led to buy Thrift Stamps, in the majority of cases, it appears, with money they obtained from their own work. On account of the fact that the sale of these stamps was, among the schools, the most representative of the war activities which had in view the raising of funds to be used directly in the prosecution of the war, this work will receive foremost emphasis. Much emphasis will also be placed upon Red Cross work, which, in its own field of endeavor, likewise ranks first. For the purpose of convenience in the matter of analysis, the work of the city schools will be considered first apart from that in the rural schools, then in comparison with it. On account of the fact that there was in the school activities, as was also true in the general conduct of the war activity campaigns, much more interest manifested in the city than in the rural schools, the former will be given first place in the following analysis.

TABLE XII.¹

**Showing Sale of Thrift Stamps in the Public Schools of Athens
White**

School	Av. Attendance	Amt. \$Subscribed	Av. Subscription
College Ave. - -	302	\$1,183.91	\$3.92
Childs St. - - -	302	2,675.77	8.86
Oconee St. - - -	161	340.29	2.12
Nantahala Ave. -	138	127.00	.93
Baxter St. - - -	229	1,914.16	8.36
Athens High - - -	267	1,492.41	5.59
Totals - - -	1,399	\$7,242.18	\$5.18

Black

Athens High			
& Industrial -	268	150.00	.56
East Athens - -	194	18.00	.09
West Athens - -	153	3.00	.02
Newton - - - -	87		
Totals - - -	702	\$ 171.00	\$0.24

After having considered the record of the negroes of Clarke County in the various war activity campaigns, we are prepared for the showing that is made in the foregoing table by the pupils of the negro schools in Athens. With nearly twice the average attendance of the negro schools, the white schools of the city have bought more

¹ Report of the Athens City Schools, 1917-18.

than forty-two times as many Thrift Stamps, and the average subscription of the white schools is more than twenty-one times as much as that of the black. If one compares again the total property of the whites with that of the blacks—the ratio, it will be recalled, is seventeen to one—it is evident that the negroes have not responded as they ought to have done. In the schools, where, if anywhere, it might be expected that the negro race through its children would have shown its greatest sensitiveness to patriotic impulse, the response has also been disappointing.

These results are recorded, too, after an appeal had been made to the pupils of the public schools to give as much as possible. The superintendent of the public schools made a plea to each teacher, and in many cases directly to the pupils. This campaign in the schools may be said, therefore, to be the registration of the sentiment produced by organized effort, typical and representative of the patriotic sentiment in the schools. As such, the results are, in the main, good, especially in the case of the white public schools.

In Red Cross work and in general war activities, as well as in the sale of Thrift Stamps, there is also a good basis for comparisons. Red Cross work was accomplished in some degree in practically every school of the system, both white and black. There was, of course, much more work done in the white schools than in the black. This is true even in the case of the grammar schools, and it is particularly true of the high schools.

Taking up the consideration of the high school for whites in Athens, we find that its Red Cross and other war activities are so numerous and varied that it is not practicable to try to reduce them to a tabular basis for comparison. The report of the principal of the Athens High School will, therefore, be given verbatim.

War Activities, Athens High School, 1917-18

Red Cross—The school organized the first Red Cross School Auxiliary in the Southern States. During the school term the school contributed a one-hundred dollar Liberty Bond and \$126.25 in cash to the local Red Cross chapter. The following articles were turned in by students. These articles were made in the regular classes or at regular periods in the afternoon:

3,410 compresses, 1,044 2x84 bandages, 371 front line bags, 286 scultetus bandages, 130 triangular bandages, 54 hot water bags, 72 baby shirts (Belgian relief), 30 baby dresses (Belgian relief), 14 baby sacques (Belgian relief), 36 pinafores, 36 bed shirts, 18 bath robes, 45 dish towels, 10 Christmas kits, 42 packing cases, 50 signal flags for local army detachment, 7,020 applicator sticks; total number of articles, 12,668.

The girls of the school worked every Saturday morning during the summer vacation at the Red Cross rooms. The packing cases for the local chapter are being made in the school during the summer, as they were during the school term.

Liberty Bonds; War Savings Stamps—The school bought Liberty Bonds and Savings Stamps as follows: Bonds bought, \$9,450; per capita, \$33.16; Stamps bought, \$1,492.41; per capita, \$52.02.

Soldiers; Sailors—One hundred eighty teachers and students of the school have entered the Army and Navy. In this number there

are 3 majors, 9 captains, 25 first lieutenants, 31 second lieutenants, 22 sergeants, 5 corporals, and 7 men in officers' training camps. Below is given the record of the graduates of classes of 1910-14:

1910, 16 graduates: 12 in army, 75 per cent; 1911, 12 graduates: 12 in army, 100 per cent; 1912, 8 graduates: 6 in army, 75 per cent; 1913, 8 graduates: 8 in army, 100 per cent; 1914, 15 graduates: 12 in army, 80 per cent. All of these men volunteered.

War Gardens—Forty-six of the boys have planted individual gardens. Others worked in their home gardens.

Summer Work—Twenty-two of the boys have enrolled for work on farms, especially wheat fields and peach orchards. Practically every boy in the school has a "job" of some sort for the summer. Numbers of the girls are also employed.

In comparison with the foregoing summary is given that of the negro high school, which is known as the Athens High and Industrial School. This summary was obtained from the principal of the school:

War Activities, Athens High and Industrial School, 1917-18

Red Cross—100 per cent strong. \$60 was given to the Junior Red Cross fund in 1918, and \$50 in 1919. \$254.50 was raised by Victory Boys and Girls.

Thrift Stamps—Thrift Stamps sold, \$150.

Graduates in Army—Out of 150 graduates to date 50 have joined the army.

War Gardening—15,000 plants, tomatoes, cabbage, egg plant, celery, peppers, etc., distributed to pupils to be used by them in their gardens at home.

Center for War Work—The schools have served as a center for war work of all kinds among the negroes.

War Relief—Contributed \$10 to Jewish War Relief Fund.

After the extended consideration already given the relative records in war activities made by the white and colored schools of the city it is unnecessary to analyze these two reports very much. A mere glance at them will serve to show that the white high school has a very much wider, more varied and more successful record than the black, a record possibly better than that of any similar high school in the state and doubtless unsurpassed by any in the South; but it is grateful to observe that the negro school has not only attempted but has actually achieved rather varied war activities. The notable difference between the two is brought out in more prominent contrast when it is recalled that, according to figures given in Table XII, the average attendance at the white school was 267 and at the black school 268.

A striking contrast is presented by the war activity work in the rural schools, for it is found that the rural schools as a whole have made a very poor showing in comparison with those of the city. As was true in the case of the city schools, efforts were made by the superintendent of the county schools to secure generous contributions of money and of work to the various war activities. The teachers were notified of the united effort to be made, and through the teachers notice was given to the pupils. The results are indicative of the lethargy of the average country school in comparison

with the average city school. It was difficult to secure even partial information from the rural schools, but every one was given an opportunity to record its war work. The questionnaire, which, in order to secure its return, was sent out with a self-addressed, stamped envelope to the various white and colored schools, requested any information available concerning any phase of war activity accomplished. Though the response to the questionnaire was not general, there were some schools which reported creditable work. From the replies sent in answer to the inquiries one may judge very well of the nature and the amount of the work accomplished:

White Schools

A. I am very sorry to state that I am not able to make a good report in regard to war activities. We did not have a Red Cross club. Though my school contributed as a whole during the last drive, I don't remember how much. Four of my pupils bought Thrift Stamps, \$5 each.

B. In regard to war activities my school and community responded to every demand of the Government. At the beginning my pupils and I aided in distributing literature and getting pledge cards during the Food Conservation Campaign. We planted a school garden which netted us about \$15. We also planted a plot of corn on the campus, from which we realized \$23. After this had been harvested we planted the plot in wheat. Ten of my forty pupils were enrolled in different agricultural clubs, thereby assisting in the production of food.

Every family in this militia district purchased War Savings Stamps, and a number of them had the cards filled out in their children's names, but 12 of my pupils purchased Thrift Stamps with money earned by themselves in small quantities.

They also contributed \$7.50 to the Red Cross fund and \$3 for Y. M. C. A. work, but the only actual Red Cross service rendered was individual, such as brushing their teeth and caring for their own bodies.

We have collected tin foil, nut shells, fruit stones, papers, scrap iron, fertilizer bags and other junk, which was sold by the individuals and by the school. We are preparing another school garden now (April 30, 1919).

C. Fifteen pupils in our school purchased Thrift Stamps; every family represented conserved food; nine of our girls have done sewing and knitting for Belgian relief; two of our boys raised additional potatoes.

Black Schools

D. I am only able to send you the names of a few persons who did active work in buying Thrift Stamps, but the few persons who worked in the Red Cross work they were so near the city of Athens until they joined the Red Cross there. (Then follow the names of seventeen persons, who, the writer says, bought Thrift Stamps. These are names of resident in the neighborhood and not of pupils).

E. I wish to inform you that the pupils did not secure any Thrift Stamps but the majority of the patrons took an active part in purchasing War Savings Stamps, Liberty Loan and Red Cross. (Then follows a list of names of patrons).

F. I write to inform you that the Brooklyn School has not accomplished much towards buying Thrift Stamps or doing Red Cross work.

In such manner it is that the teachers of the rural schools report

concerning the work that has been done in their schools in these phases of war activity, where any work at all has been done. In comparison with the city schools the rural schools have accomplished almost nothing in Thrift Stamp and Red Cross work. If it were not for the reports returned by the Hinton-Brown and the Normal Rural white schools, which are given in the foregoing summaries as B and C, the work of the rural schools in this particular, as outlined here, would be almost negligible. As it is, the work done at these two schools, especially at the Hinton-Brown school, shows what could have been accomplished at almost any one of the rural schools. Some of the rural schools with the largest number of pupils and with the best industrial development as basis for support, have done practically nothing, which shows that this matter is one of sensitiveness to patriotic stimuli rather than one of financial ability to help.

One other form of war activity should be mentioned in connection with the two phases already discussed. It is the work of organizations peculiarly adapted to rural schools, such as pig and corn clubs and canning clubs. This work has merely been hinted at in the few school reports that have been given. It was well organized in Clarke County, especially among the white schools, through the supervision of the State College of Agriculture. Miss Eldona Oliver, the home demonstration agent for Clarke County, has efficiently conducted this work and has compiled a record of the varied and excellent activities of these clubs in the canning, preserving and conservation of food, as well as in other related endeavors. Though Miss Oliver has given lectures and demonstrations in this work to the negro teachers of the county, no negro home demonstration agent has been appointed for the negro schools. There is consequently no record available of the work of this kind that has been done in these schools, but it has manifestly been very little. If there had been a home demonstration agent in charge of the negro schools, as in the case of the white, the negro schools would doubtless have made a better record in this important phase of war work.

It appears from the facts presented in this chapter that even the Clarke County negro schools, both the teachers and the pupils, are greatly lacking in patriotic spirit and achievement.

Negro children of school age should be especially susceptible to patriotic impulses. Not even the great impressionability of the negro child, however, is of much aid here; for, "back of the child, and affecting him both directly and indirectly, are the characteristics of the race. He has little conception of the meaning of virtue, truth, honor, manhood, integrity."¹ He has, consequently, but little of the spirit of genuine patriotism, which is the companion of these other virtues.

¹ Odum, H. W. *Social and Mental Traits of the Negro*, p. 39.

CHAPTER IV.

CIVILIAN RELIEF WORK OF THE RED CROSS

From the soldier at the front to the humblest civilian at home extends the line of defence of a nation at war. In no great war has the truth of this statement been more thoroughly emphasized than in the one that has just closed. This relationship of the civilian to the soldier has many phases. It is the purpose of this chapter to consider only one of them. In Chapters II and III, a discussion was had of the relationship of the civilian population at large and the school population in particular with reference to the various war activities. In this chapter consideration will be given to another phase of civilian relationship, that of the family or relatives of the soldier to the government and to the man in camp or at the front, and the relationship in turn of the soldier to his relatives at home and to the government.

In the supreme crisis of war when there was urgent need of the most complete and most sympathetic coöperation of the civilian population with the forces of the government in aiding in every way the successful prosecution of the war, it is a matter of importance to observe what was the attitude of negro civilians and in this way to understand their relations with negroes who were in the army. The most complete and illuminating data of this kind, as well as the most dependable, is to be found in the records of the American Red Cross, to which organization the government intrusted this kind of army work for both whites and blacks. As a writer in a recent number of *The Southern Workman* expresses it, "The American Red Cross knows no creed or color. It extends military and civilian relief to the colored people both at home and abroad in the same spirit of service as it is offered to the whites."¹ Both the completeness and the impartiality of the civilian relief work done by the Red Cross will be amply shown in this chapter.

An examination of the complete records of the Athens Chapter of the American Red Cross for the entire period of the war and for the post-war period up to April 1, 1919, discloses the fact that a very large majority of the cases managed by the local chapter during that time has been negroes. The first consideration then will be given to numerical proportion of white and black beneficiaries of the civilian relief work.

¹ *The Southern Workman*, December, 1918.

TABLE XIII.¹

Showing the Number of Civilian Relief Cases Managed by the Red Cross

	No. of Cases	Percentage	Percentage of Population
White - - - - -	129	34.4	49.3
Black - - - - -	245	65.6	50.7
Total - - -	375		

Cases of negro civilian relief far exceed those of the whites, as this table shows. The number of negro cases is almost twice as large as that of the whites. Stated in terms of percentage, the 129 cases of the whites are about thirty-four and a half per cent of the total, while the cases credited to the blacks form a little more than sixty-five and a half per cent. Considered merely on the basis of number, the blacks show a decidedly more marked trend toward dependency than do the whites.

Dependency on the part of the negro is shown clearly not only in the number but also in the character of the cases. The matters brought before the Red Cross representatives show in an interesting way the childlike dependency of the negro applicants. It is in this particular that one discovers the basic difference between the aid sought by the whites and that desired by the negroes. The white applicant invariably asks for information not commonly known, but the negro applicant requests all kinds of information from the simplest to the most complex. The white applicant secures his information and then makes use of it himself, giving no further trouble to the Red Cross agent. The negro applicant asks for a letter to be written, oftener than otherwise for a series of letters, and the entire case, sometimes involving months of correspondence and often personal investigation, must be managed in its every detail by the Red Cross. It may be seen readily from this general consideration of the matter how deep and fundamental is the difference. The white applicant shows self-reliance, the negro manifests too often the childlike dependence upon the whites that has always characterized him.

Practically all the white cases come under one head, while the negro applicants may be classified under several. Invariably the whites asked for information. The negroes, too, asked for information, but of a much more general kind than did the whites. A large number of negro applicants inquired about allotments, some about insurance policies, and others sought to know the whereabouts and other information concerning relatives in the army. In this large number of inquiries not only was the dependency and helplessness of the blacks shown, but also their ignorance, superstition and fear.

¹ The main statistics for this table were secured through the active assistance and generous courtesy of Miss Corinne Gerdine, Secretary, Home Division, Athens Chapter, American Red Cross.

It should be remembered, however, that the contrast just outlined is not complete, or absolute, but relative. In view of the varying conditions that are presented by the applicants for civilian relief, it would be unfair and unwise to endeavor to make the comparison more than a general estimate of the total conditions presented. There are instances on record in the files of the Athens Chapter of the Red Cross which show utter dependency and illiteracy on the part of both white civilians and soldiers. These cases are few, however, and this fact is to be remembered in the interpretation of these conditions.

Though the records of both the Red Cross and the Local Board may furnish data concerning the matter of illiteracy among whites and blacks, yet the Red Cross records, from the nature of the work of this organization in aiding not only soldiers but also civilians, are likely to be more complete in the individual cases in their indication not only of the soldier affected but also of his dependents and relatives. While definite statistics from neither of these sources are available, an examination of the Red Cross records shows that there are many more black than white illiterates.

This condition of illiteracy should engage the most careful attention of the people of Clarke County. The illiterate soldiers come from the remote parts of the county, to which the influences of education have not penetrated or in which these influences have for some reason not been utilized. Even though the percentage of illiteracy is comparatively small, there is far too much among both white and black soldiers and civilians. It is the scarcity of white illiterates and dependents that so sharply differentiates the whites from the blacks.

Other cases managed by the Red Cross illustrate not only ignorance but even dishonesty. It may be said very truthfully that in the majority of cases the negro soldiers and their civilian relatives regarded the Red Cross as an agency that was formed to aid them and to which respect was due. They respected not only the Red Cross but also any other agency that would help them, and they soon became as dependent as children upon such organizations for aid of the simplest kind. Though most of them respected the Red Cross and the government, there were some who regarded both of these agencies as legitimate prey. If they had an opportunity of obtaining money from either of these organizations fraudulently, they seized upon the chance and gave little thought to the right or wrong of the methods employed. They seemed to have little conception of their moral responsibility to either the Red Cross or to the government. A few typical cases sketched with sufficient fullness to show clearly the motives, both good and evil, back of them, will serve to illustrate this much better than generalizations.

Case A. A negro soldier who at the time was confined in the hospital at Camp Grant, Illinois, made a request of the Red Cross agent

there to communicate with his mother in Athens. The Red Cross agent wrote to the agent of the organization in Athens in part as follows: "Soldier asks that Red Cross render first assistance to his mother. Soldier's service record has been lost, he has received no pay since he has been in the service and would appreciate any assistance you may be able to give until such time as he is able to send funds himself." The case was at once investigated. It was discovered that the mother was a cook receiving excellent pay in one of the most prominent homes in the city. The mother herself had been saving all she could out of her wages and had been sending it regularly to the soldier at Camp Grant for spending money. There were two other sons at home. One of these was at the time ill, the other was in good health and was well dressed. When asked if he secured all the work he wanted, he replied that he did. If he had worked regularly, he could have easily supported the brother who was ill. The mother, if she had taken the money she gave to the son at Camp Grant, could have readily supported the son who for the time was dependent on her on account of illness. The Red Cross agent arranged for the payment of the doctor's bill and for medicines needed. The mother was assured that if the boy was ill very long, the Red Cross would pay the drug bills. The Red Cross agent kept in close communication with the sick man until his recovery several weeks later.

Case B. In the form of a letter from the Red Cross agent at Camp Sevier, South Carolina, this case was first brought to the attention of the Athens Chapter. It was shown in this letter that several inquiries had been directed by the agent at Camp Sevier to the wife of a soldier in camp who wished to communicate with her. The wife lived with her mother in Athens. No reply had been received to any of these letters, so the Athens agent of the Red Cross was asked to investigate. An investigation was made, but the woman who was the wife of the man could not be found. Her mother, however, was found and explained the conditions. From what the mother said the daughter had received threatening letters regularly from her husband, who in this way had forced her regularly to send back to him the allotment which the government compelled him to make to her. These threatening letters had been kept up so long that the wife finally ran away from her mother's home in order to escape receiving them. The mother said she had been unable to find her daughter and that she had no knowledge of where her daughter was. The wife had said repeatedly before she ran away that she did not want any of the money, that she was tired of receiving it and being worried with it, and that if any other allotments came she would send them back to her husband or to Washington,—anything in order to get rid of them.

Case C. Another negro soldier who was in the hospital at Fort McPherson in July (1918) had not communicated for some time in any way with his wife in Athens. The wife, having received no news from her husband for a long time, requested the Athens Red Cross to make inquiry concerning his condition. On August 12th the man was reported better. On September 4th the man notified the Red Cross agent at the hospital that his wife and two children were receiving no allotment from him, and he asked that the case be investigated. An investigation in Athens showed that the allotments had been delayed but that all of the past due allotments, together with the current one, had just been sent to the wife, who had received at one time \$400. April 18, 1919, a letter was received from the Fort McPherson Red Cross agent with the statement that the negro soldier in question had been reported a deserter from

December 17, 1917, through December 31, 1918, and that on account of the delay in reporting the desertion the allotment had been paid to his wife until she had received \$440. This, she was told, she would have to repay the government. The negro woman promptly replied that she had no money but that she had spent all of it. This occurred within five months of the receipt of the large sum mentioned above. In the meantime the husband arrived in Athens and presented his discharge papers. It was soon discovered that the length of his period of desertion had been an error and that it had been determined by government officials that the correct period of desertion was about one month. When the negro woman was told that she must repay the allotment for this period, about \$40, she again said she had no money. At the time of the investigation she had not returned the amount to the government and had apparently no idea of doing so except under compulsion.

Case D. The mother of this negro soldier, who lived in Athens, asked the local Red Cross secretary to communicate with her son, who had been for some time in the Army hospital for tuberculosis patients at Denver, Colorado. It was the desire of the mother to secure a discharge for her son in order that she might nurse him at home. When the Red Cross secretary in Athens became aware of the mother's desire to have her son return home, the secretary at once suggested to the mother that Denver was the best place for one who was suffering from tuberculosis, better by far than Athens or any similar place. The letters the mother had been receiving from her son had always been cheerful, though the soldier was seriously ill. Finally a letter came, written in a shaky hand, the writing itself, despite the courage and optimism of the writer, revealing his serious condition. The Athens Red Cross secretary wrote immediately and inquired concerning his condition. In their reply the hospital authorities at Denver made clear the policy of the army with reference to such cases, assuring the mother that she would be notified at once in case of the development of critical conditions. Not very long afterwards a telegram came to the mother, informing her of the need of her presence in Denver. As the mother was unable to buy the ticket to Denver, the local Red Cross chapter bought it for her. The mother arrived in Denver in sufficient time to be with her son for twelve days before he died. As it is customary in the army for some one to accompany the remains of a dead soldier to his home, the Denver authorities selected the mother for this office and gave her a voucher for the price of the return ticket. When she came back to Athens, she had this voucher cashed and brought the entire amount, about twenty-five dollars, to the Red Cross secretary to pay for the ticket given to her by the Red Cross when she had left. As she had spent all of her meager savings in paying her expenses while she was in Denver, she asked that she be allowed keep a part of the amount and return it to the Red Cross later. This was readily granted, and the loan was repaid. She was most grateful for the aid of the Red Cross, both in Athens and in Denver, and spoke of her undying appreciation. She was a notable example of honesty, integrity and gratitude, though she was utterly dependent upon the Red Cross and its agents.

In summarizing the net results of this part of the investigation it may be seen that dependency with reference to both whites and blacks has been shown. A very few cases of complete white dependency were observed, but by far the greater number of these cases were negroes. As a whole the results obtained serve to show

the wide breach between the morality and civilization of the whites and the blacks. As has been observed: "He (the negro) has no consciously acquired moral standards, for he is still a child race. The hackneyed expression applies: he is non-moral rather than immoral, as a race and according to Anglo-Saxon standards. . . . We cannot, therefore, reasonably expect the American negro to respond to his environment just as the white man does.'"

¹ McCord, Chas. H. **The American Negro as a Dependent, Defective and Delinquent**, p. 118

CHAPTER V.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON SKILLED AND UNSKILLED
LABOR

1. General Labor Conditions

From the consideration of negro military man-power and the record of the blacks in contributing both money and energy to the specific war activity campaigns it is but one step further to the analysis of the various conditions pertaining to labor. It has been demonstrated in earlier chapters of this study that the negroes did not make a notable response to the demands of the war activity campaigns. In the analysis of these conditions it has been shown that the failure of the negro to measure up to the higher demands of citizenship has been caused in part by his economic inferiority. Though in point of economic rank the negro is inferior to the white, yet with respect to his availability and adaptability as a laborer, particularly in certain fields of labor, he has had during the war an unusual opportunity to prove his worth as a citizen and patriot. It will, therefore, be the purpose of the present chapter to attempt to develop this phase of the question as it relates to both skilled and unskilled labor.

In the case of the war activity campaigns the majority of the negroes of the county had comparatively little, if any money, to give; on the other hand, they had as their greatest asset the time and ability to work. With exceptionally high wages and a broader variety of work open to even the unskilled laborer, there was little reason why there should have been much idleness, and no reason at all for vagrancy. While vagrancy was comparatively slight, nevertheless the negro's inherent tendency not to work regularly when wages were so high that the pay for a few days of work would support him for a week was manifest. Especially was this true of those who received allotments from the government, some of whom discontinued work as long as the allotments lasted.

These general labor conditions were understood very well in the state even before the close of 1917, after the United States had been engaged in the war for only about six or eight months. The State Commissioner of Commerce and Labor referred to them in his report made at the close of the year 1917, and at that time he also pointed out the need of a compulsory work law. This law was passed at the next session of the General Assembly in the summer of 1918. The nature of its requirements and the results of its enforcement will be taken up later in this chapter. The summary of labor conditions and the recommendation of the Commissioner are embraced in the following words:

"After a very careful study of conditions, I am thoroughly of the opinion that we should have in Georgia a compulsory work law of not less than five days per week for all able-bodied males. . . .

We have in Georgia very many work-slackers. Common labor is paid more now for three days than was formerly paid for a week's work, and many see no necessity for working longer each week than is necessary to provide food and sustenance for the remaining period. The law should be made to apply alike to all classes of our citizens. If all able-bodied males were required to work five full days in each week, the situation in Georgia would immediately improve. I earnestly recommend the passage of a compulsory work law in Georgia. In my judgment it is the most important measure that can engage the time and attention of the General Assembly at the coming session."¹

According to an estimate made by the Commissioner of Commerce and Labor for Georgia, there was throughout the state during the war an average shortage in general labor of twenty per cent, or one-fifth. It is the opinion of the clerk in charge of this work in the office of the Commissioner in Atlanta that conditions in Clarke County, with its very nearly equal proportions of white and colored population, were about on the average with the shortage for the entire state. There was a decided shortage in labor in Athens and in the factory districts immediately adjacent to the city. Particularly was this true of the plants that employed unskilled labor. A very clear indication of this is to be observed in several interviews that have been incorporated into this chapter. The marked shortage in unskilled labor may be accounted for not only by the negro migration and the drafting of these men for army service, but also by the fact that the great demand around the city for help a little above that of unskilled labor but still demanding very little of the element of skill, as well as the inducement of higher wages, caused many of the unskilled laborers to enter this class of work during the war.

That negro migration from the city of Athens has taken place to a considerable extent since the beginning of the Great War is hardly to be doubted, though it is difficult to reduce the matter to a statistical basis. The migration began, as has been indicated, soon after the outbreak of the Great War and long before the United States entered the conflict. It appears that it had its beginning in the great demand for workers in the munition factories and in other plants that were manufacturing supplies for the countries that were then fighting Germany.

It will hardly be questioned that the causes of the migration from Clarke County were essentially the same as for the average county in the Black Belt. These causes have been admirably summarized in a broad way in the introduction to a bulletin issued recently by the United States Department of Labor: "In considering the move-

¹ Stanley, H. M. Preface to the *Sixth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Commerce and Labor of the State of Georgia* for the fiscal year ending December 31, 1917, p. 4.

ment as a whole I think we should face two broad truths, which I hope I may be pardoned for mentioning, for they are of importance in studying the story of economic and social changes. One of the truths to which I allude is that the desire of any people or class of people to improve their condition of living is a natural and healthy desire, and that their effort to gain such improvement is a commendable effort. The migration of negroes from one part of the country to another, like all racial and popular migrations in history, expresses such desire and effort. Whether the movement result in the desired advancement is another matter. The second broad truth to which I beg to call attention is this: The genuine progress of a country depends upon the spread of good conditions of living and good chances of healthy improvement among all the people of the country, not only among those of any class, or race, or profession, or occupation, but among all, including especially those who have hitherto had the least chance through power, education, inheritance."¹

Migration of negroes from Clarke County continued almost to the close of the war. This information is vouched for by some of the best informed men in Athens, men who are thoroughly familiar with the negro population here. The migration had very little effect upon the rural districts, but it seems to have been rather marked in Athens. One of the officials of the Local Board for Clarke County is authority for the statement that many negroes left the city after they had registered, their purpose being to go to places where they could enter essential industries. On account of the fact that there are no labor unions among the negroes of Athens, it is impossible to reduce the matter of the negro migration here to a statistical basis of comparison.

There are comparatively few labor unions among the negroes. Where such unions are organized they invariably include skilled laborers only. Negro labor unions, therefore, are found only in the larger cities. A large majority of the negroes are unskilled laborers, mainly farmers and workers of similar type. They are consequently not organized into labor unions. There is an indication, however, in the interviews obtained in Clarke County that this class of negro labor is beginning to comprehend the meaning and the use of organization among laborers. One of the employers interviewed seems to think that the negroes are already secretly organizing themselves into labor unions. It appears that there is no proof or good reasons for believing this; but it is just as certainly apparent that there is coming to be a somewhat more definitely unified spirit among the negroes relative to the disposition of the most important commodity which they possess, labor. They are keeping better informed as to prices paid for labor, and are insisting on receiving the highest current wages. The war is probably responsible in the main

¹ Dillard, J. H. Introduction to *Negro Migration in 1916-17*, bulletin U. S. Department of Labor, p. 9.

for this in that it has raised wages in so many departments of negro labor to rates previously unheard of in the South and has in this way whetted the naturally keen desire of the negro of today to receive the greatest possible pay for his toil. It is also doubtless true that many negroes in the army have had opportunities of observing the operations of organized labor and upon their return home have told their neighbors of these things and have caused them also to become more keenly interested in labor conditions.

It is self-evident that the war caused a great increase in the wages paid for every kind of labor. It will, therefore, not be the purpose of this paper to enter into minute comparisons between pre-war and war-time conditions of labor. Only a few of the more typical and more representative phases of negro labor will be considered. Of these, as has already been indicated, farm labor forms an important part. Unskilled laborers in general form another large element.

TABLE XIV.
Showing Increase in Wages Paid Farm Laborers

	Wages per Day Before the War	Wages per Day During the War	Average Per cent of Inc.
General Laborer - -	\$0.75 to \$1.00	\$1.50	71.60
Cotton Chopper - -	1.00 to 1.25	2.50 to 3.00	145.54
Cotton Picker - -	.50 to .75	1.00 to 1.50 ¹	100.00

TABLE XV.
Showing Increase in Wages Paid Other Unskilled Laborers

	Wages per Day Before the War	Wages per Day During the War	Average Per cent of Inc.
Fertilizer Laborers -	\$1.25 to \$1.50	\$3.00	118.11
Ditchers and Other City Laborers - -	1.25 to 1.50	2.50	83.21
Railroad Laborers - -	.75 to 1.10	2.25 to 2.40	152.17

It may easily be seen from these tables that in general the price of labor has doubled under the influence of war conditions. In some cases it has even increased to three times as much as it was before the war. While the foregoing tables represent the type of laborers who are by far more numerous in Athens and in Clarke County, nevertheless it is true that in every form of unskilled labor in which negroes are employed wages have advanced in proportion. These figures then may be taken as characteristic of the advance in wages of unskilled negro labor.

In the field of skilled labor the most numerous employees are the servants engaged in domestic and hotel service, such as cooks, waiters, butlers, etc. The following table shows the advance in the cost of service of this kind:

¹ These figures apply to the price paid per 100 pounds.

TABLE XVI.¹

Showing Increase in Wages Paid Domestic and Hotel Servants

	Wages per Week Before the War	Wages per Week During the War	Per cent of Inc.
Private Homes			
Cooks (Women) -	\$1.50 to \$2.00	\$3.00 to \$4.00	100
Butlers (Men) - -	3.00 to 5.00	5.00 to 10.00	66.67 to 100
Hotels			
Cooks (Men) - - -	4.00 to 5.00	8.00 to 10.00	100
Waiters (Men) - -	8.00 to 10.00	15.00 to 19.00	87.50 to 100

Of this class of laborers even more than of the unskilled type it would be expected that the wages would advance. Even at the higher rates the supply of laborers has not equaled the demand. At the same time the class of service has been very low, characterized very frequently as both expensive and unreliable.

Tendencies in labor as shown in the foregoing tables are even more vividly and graphically presented in personal interviews with employers. A number of these interviews have been obtained in order to give the individual point of view relative to present labor conditions in the county. From these interviews the scarcity, the high price and the shiftlessness of labor will be understood. Negroes were hard to manage, and they did just as little work as they could to draw their pay. There was a feeling among employers of negro labor that they must endure the unsatisfactory service of the negroes as a matter of necessity. They naturally expected to increase the wages of laborers in keeping with prices of other things, but they felt keenly, and still feel, the failure of labor to return good, steady work for these wages. In the following interviews the employers give directly their opinions concerning labor conditions:

Unskilled Labor

A. "Dealing with war labor on the farm was about the most unsatisfactory work I have ever done," said a typical farmer in describing his own experiences. "Labor was scare and high. Very little work could be gotten out of negroes, because there were too many people who wanted your laborers. I believe that extra high wages such as we had during the war and still have create idleness. A farmer couldn't afford to get after a negro for loafing on the job. If he did, he might lose what labor he had. So we had to put up with it. Even after the ground was broken up and ready for crops in the spring it was hard to tell how much to plant, because the supply of laborers was so uncertain. I have seen farmers give even little negro girls \$1.50 to \$2.00 a day to get cotton chopped out. They were glad to get grown negro men and women to chop cotton at \$3.00 a day. When the cotton was made, you had to pay \$1.50 a hundred to get it picked, and often you couldn't get pickers at all. There were some farmers who didn't have so much trouble,

¹ Statistics in Tables XIV, XV and XVI were secured from employers.

but every one who depended on negro labor knows how hard it was to hire and work negroes during the war. It seemed that everything drew labor away from the farm. The fertilizer and other factories needed help, and the sorriest and most worthless negro could go to the city and make a living. With the factories and the army draining out the labor, the farmers had to suffer."

B. From the manager of a large fertilizer plant was secured this interview concerning negro labor in that industry. The manager is a man of mature years and has been in charge of the plant for a long time. Before assuming the management of this plant he had been for many years the supervisor of negro labor on the farm, so that altogether he spoke of the character of negro labor from the observation and experience of practically a life time. The plant itself has the best and most modern equipment, with ample capital back of it, thereby insuring the most desirable working conditions.

A year of work in the plant is divided into two seasons. The busier season lasts but three months, February, March, and April. During these months the work consists not only in mixing and manufacturing fertilizers but also in shipping these manufactured products to the various consumers. The remaining nine months of the year constitute the season when the fertilizers are manufactured and stored away, except for light shipments made during a part of the autumn. It is during the first of these seasons, therefore, that the larger number of laborers are required. The pay-roll of the plant includes as many as 155 names during this season, while during the remainder of the year the number of negroes employed fluctuates from 75 to 100, with an average pay-roll of about 90. While a few of these laborers who do the lighter work are not adults, nearly all of them are grown men and receive full pay. This is unskilled labor, most of these negroes being recruited from adjacent farms. They are what are termed "field hands," or field laborers, and most of them, when they have completed the work of the busy season at the fertilizer plant, go back to the farm. Before the war it was the custom of the negroes who worked during the busier season at the fertilizer plant to spend much of the remainder of the year in idleness. This they could afford to do, because of the fact that they received such high wages during the busier season at the plant. The manager of the plant even believes that some of them make sufficient money during these three months to support them without work during the next nine months. Notwithstanding the fact that during the summer of 1918 when the demand for labor of every kind was so great and every laborer, both white and colored, throughout the nation was urged by moral suasion and even by legislation to aid in the work of the country in its critical hour of participation in the Great War by keeping constantly employed, these negroes were indifferent as to whether or not they worked all of the time, as they made sufficient money from their brief season of work in the plant to keep them from having to work continually throughout the remainder of the year unless they wished to do so. There are two particularly important points shown in the statement made by the manager. One is that the negroes did not work as well nor were they as easily managed during the war as they were before; the other is that even now when the war is over the negroes are not yet rendering as good service as they did before the war. The manager of the plant is convinced that he did not secure as large returns in work from the laborers at \$3 a day as he received before the war when their pay was only from \$1.25 to \$1.50 per day. The same conditions continue to prevail since the war closed, and the negroes have so far failed to re-adjust themselves either

to the former wage scale or efficiency of service. While it is easier to secure labor today than it was a year ago, it is necessary to pay practically all the labor \$3 per day. It is interesting to note the words of the manager in describing labor conditions in the plant during the war:

"They (the negro laborers) were absolutely uncontrollable. I had to ask them to do a thing, pay them, and then let them take their own time. I believe, too, that in managing negroes I can get about as much work out of them as anybody. There was only one idea that seemed to be in their minds, 'If I quit, can he get anybody else?' 'Since the war has closed they are working a little better, but not as well as they did before the war. Yet they are the best labor we can get. We have never been able to get any laborers more satisfactory for the work of the fertilizer plant, which is dusty, dirty and disagreeable. They are as easy to handle as any other labor, and we can usually get as many of them as we want. They have no unions, and they don't go on strikes. These things are all in their favor. Though the negroes are not organized now, I think it will not be long before they will begin to organize."

C. In the case of the manager of another fertilizer plant who was interviewed, the shortage of labor and the handicap of labor conditions both during the war and since its close were likewise affirmed. The manager of this plant was a comparatively young man, probably about thirty-eight years old. He had, however, been manager of fertilizer plants for a period of fifteen years, his first experience in the work having been gained in Florida. Throughout the interview he made numerous references to the conditions of labor in the Florida plant, as well as to the conditions in the Clarke County plant during the war and since its close. As he had been manager of the local plant for a comparatively short time, about a year and a half, he was not very familiar with labor conditions as they existed before the war. He drew inferences, however, from the condition in which he found labor at the time he assumed his duties here and also from what he had learned from inquiries about former conditions at the plant.

From all these sources had come sufficient information to convince him that the scarcity of labor had materially affected the output of the plant during the war and that it was still exerting a similar effect. He could use, he said, as many as 125 negroes at the time he gave the interview, which was near the close of March when the busy season was at its height. He had, however, at that time only 35 laborers. At about the same time the year before, which was at a very critical period of the war, he had on his payroll about 49 laborers. This practical comparison led him to believe that the scarcity of labor at his plant since the war closed has been even greater than it was during the time when the war was still in progress. In further substantiation of his belief he pointed to the fact that the plant had been known to employ as many as 300 or 400 in the busy season of the year 1913. The average number of men employed then during the year was between 75 and 100. He estimated that the average number of men employed for the year now did not exceed 25. All of these were colored, only two white men besides himself being employed in the entire plant. The pre-war wage scale was about \$1.25 per day. During the war the daily pay ranged from \$1.75 to \$2.25, while since the war it has ranged from \$2.75 to \$3.25. Notwithstanding the fact that he is offering higher wages now than he did during the war, labor is harder to get and is more unsatisfactory. He believes that negro labor as he knows it is even less trustworthy and effective now

than it was during the war. He bases his judgment on practically a lifetime acquaintance with negro labor.

"Negro laborers that work here are lazy," said he. "They are not insolent or impudent but careless and of no account. They just idle around and fill in a day's time in some way. Though they are no good, we can't run one off. We must have labor of some kind. I can drive them and manage to get a pretty good day's work out of them. The average work expected from a fertilizer laborer is four tons a day. I insist on getting about six tons daily. As sorry as they are, they are easier to manage than dagoes (Italians), for I worked dagoes in Florida. The dagoes are fairly good hands but they are slow. They wouldn't do much even if we could get them into Georgia, so the negro is about as good as we can get. You can drive a negro, but you can't drive a dago. They won't stand for it. It seems now that we can't get any more negro laborers. I believe that they are already secretly organizing into unions. Unless that helps explain the shortage of labor, I don't know what does."

D. Of all these labor conditions the ones that most closely affected the home during the war were those of securing and retaining cooks and domestic servants. The experience of a housewife in this particular is given in this interview. During the nineteen months the war lasted this housewife, who is representative of the best home life in the city, had five cooks. It was her opinion that she fared as well in this matter of servants as the average housekeeper who was compelled to retain a cook. She pronounced all of these servants inferior to the ones she had before the war. Two of them were of about average merit, while the others ranged all the way from that degree of merit to utter worthlessness. Considering the five in a group, she called them "very poor." Their defects were very easily seen. They were untrained, ignorant, and unsatisfactory generally. She had endeavored to show them and train them in order to keep them interested in the work, but they made a failure in each instance despite her efforts.

Practically without exception they began well. They showed interest and enthusiasm in their work at first, but invariably this good beginning came quickly to a poor end. She was very much discouraged by the fact that these negro servants would not remain with her. She believes this instability of nature is a general characteristic of negro women who are house servants. She could see no improvement in these servants while they were with her, but they actually became less efficient, more careless and indifferent. Very soon they would say that they were tired of the work and that they were compelled to have a rest. This was true of practically every one, the sorry ones and the better ones alike. Whenever they remained with her a fairly good length of time, they showed a tendency at intervals to neglect their work. These "slumps," as the housekeeper called them, the servants would fall into occasionally, and their work during these periods was too poor and unsatisfactory for anyone to bear. The only way this housewife has been able to retain a cook lately has been to increase the wages to a little above what is ordinarily being paid for that class of service. She now pays her cook about \$5.25 per week.

E. Conditions with reference to skilled labor in hotels as represented by waiters, cooks, bellboys and all colored help, were summarized by the manager of a large hotel. The manager is a man above middle age and of long experience in the conduct of hotels. He has dealt with this class of negro labor for many years, and he said emphatically that the conditions during the war were the worst

he had ever seen. Even before the war began he observed a certain scantiness of labor, though he was usually able before the war to secure at reasonable wages all the colored help he needed. These conditions changed almost at once as soon as the war began, as a decided shortage in help was noted almost immediately. In order to overcome this shortage the manager made a general increase of fifty per cent in wages. The effect of this increase upon the supply of labor, however, was hardly noticeable. The shortage in labor became more and more acute throughout the war. Even at these higher wages the hotel help did no better work, but they became even more lazy and trifling. They took no interest in their work, but they constantly neglected it. They were indifferent as to whether they worked or not, but they seemed to think they could keep their jobs in either case. This, of course, made them harder to manage, for their minds were occupied by the numerous things that at any time tend to demoralize negro workers. A certain amount of indifference is always met with in negro hotel help, and it is naturally expected; but such gross indifference the manager had never encountered before.

With reference to post-war conditions he is convinced that the shortage in such negro labor as he employs is constantly growing. He is frank to admit that such conditions are contrary to what he expected. Though he did not believe that labor conditions among his negro help would return to normal immediately upon the close of the war, yet he thought that within a comparatively short time there would be indications of a return to normal conditions. If there are such conditions now, he is unable to discover them. Since these unusual conditions have already persisted longer after the close of the war than he had expected, he is at a loss to know how much longer they will continue. It is to him unthinkable that they will continue indefinitely, though he is of the opinion that negro labor will never get back to the wage scale that was in force before the war. With reference to present tendencies it seems to him that it is not only true that the shortage comes more and more to be felt but also that the inefficiency of hotel labor is increasing. When urged to express an opinion concerning future conditions, he would not even hazard a conjecture. In dismissing the topic under discussion he finally said that it was something about which he did not care to talk, for, as he phrased it, he was "sore about it."

Complaints from guests in the hotel concerning the inattention of servants were common, even more common now than during the war. The only reply he could make to these was to try to show the ones who complained what a problem faces the hotel manager. "I usually tell them," said he, "that by registering complaints they are heaping more burdens upon my shoulders. I can't do anything to stop this indifference, for if I get after the servants who are inattentive, I may lose all of my help. So there you are!"

F. As it has been shown in a former Phelps-Stokes Study that negro women prefer washing to cooking and that a majority of them do washing in order to earn a livelihood, it is interesting to observe the experiences of the head of a family in securing a washerwoman during the war. For many years before the war the same negro woman had done the washing for this family. She continued to do the work for some time after the war began, then she asked to be relieved of it. When asked as to why she did not wish to continue the work, she said she wished to rest for a time. An investigation showed that she gave up the washing soon after she began to receive an allotment from the government, the allotment having been made by her son in the army. It appears that when she dis-

continued the laundry work for this family she gave up laundering entirely.

The head of the family began at once a search for another washerwoman. For a time it was impossible to secure one, though a diligent search was made. Inquiry of neighbors disclosed the fact that similar experiences were being undergone by many of them. Another washerwoman was finally secured. She did fairly good work but soon quit. Search was again made for another. Finally another one was secured, but she did such very poor washing that for this reason it was impossible to retain her. In this way the head of the family endeavored during the war period to keep a washerwoman, two of them having been tried during the period of the war whereas before the war the work had been done satisfactorily by one for many years. After the war closed the first washerwoman returned and again took up the work, the government allotment having been discontinued. In this particular family, which consisted of only two members, the price paid for the laundry before the war was \$1.10, while war prices ran as high as \$2 and more.

"Negro washerwomen during the war were the most independent I have ever seen," said the head of the family. "When negroes draw government money, it is a hard matter to get them to work. Never in my life have I seen such conditions in getting the family wash done. There have been times when we thought that prices for washing were a little too high and that good washerwomen were scarce, but it was nothing like the conditions we knew during the war. My own experience was like that of many others, for I know personally of many washerwomen who quit taking in washing at any price during the war. They could do it because they were receiving a government allotment from some relative in the army, or because their husbands were working at high wages for the government operated railroads or for some other firm that paid big wages."

G. Explaining in the beginning that though she had tried both methods of making a living she preferred washing to cooking, a robust, middle-aged negress gave the statements that form the basis of this interview. In addition to having served as a cook in a private home she had also for a time served as a maid in one of the University dormitories, but she preferred the duties of a washerwoman to those of either of the other phases of work. She explained that though when she cooked she secured her own meals free, nevertheless she could work for only one family, while as a washerwoman she could work for as many different persons as she had strength to do the washing. Furthermore, she could do her work usually in about five days, giving her Friday and Saturday, in part or entirely, for work around her home. By doing washing she was also enabled to spend nearly all of her time at home, which she preferred because she liked her home. The appearance of her home, a neat two-room house, seemed to verify this statement. There was a well tended plot of flowers in the small yard, and all the available space adjacent to this on the lot had been broken up and prepared for gardening. A small inclosure in one corner of the yard, in which a number of chickens were kept, was a matter of special pride to her. As her husband was dead and her only son, who was married, was in the army in France, it was necessary for her to earn her own living. Month in and month out she had found no method more satisfactory than that of washing.

Differences between her experiences as a washerwoman before the war, during the war and since the war, were very readily distinguished by her, particularly the contrast between the latter two

periods. The pre-war and post-war conditions resemble each other very much, as she saw them. The contrast is drawn largely in terms of war and post-war conditions, these being more clearly in her mind. During the war she did about half as much washing as now, but her total earnings then about equal her earnings now. It has always been her custom to do washing for men. During the war she received invariably one dollar for each person, while now she receives only forty or fifty cents for the same work. At that time she did washing for soldiers, now she does it for students. There is no essential difference between the amount of clothes of the soldier and the student, but there is a difference otherwise. The work for the soldiers she found pleasant and remunerative, while that for the students is not so satisfactory in either of these particulars. Each soldier for whom she washed paid her on the average a dollar a week for his washing. This was paid promptly and regularly. Under these conditions she was able to pay the high prices on soap, starch and other necessities, yet make a good profit on her labor. It was not necessary for her to solicit work, for all the work she cared to do was available for her. She did washing regularly each week for ten or twelve soldiers, the proceeds of this work being sufficient to pay her expenses and to enable her to live comfortably. She now does laundry work for twenty-two students, for which she receives on the average about as much as she did during the war, as it is her purpose to do sufficient work to afford her a fixed income. The present work she does not like so well as that she did during the war for two reasons: in the first place, she is compelled to do much more work in order to provide living expenses, in the second place, her collections at forty and fifty cents per week for each individual are not so surely or so easily made as they were at one dollar per week. The students are not so dependable or so good pay as the soldiers. Occasionally a student will, without any just reason, refuse to pay her at all, in which case, even though she may discontinue to do the washing for that particular student, she loses that part of her week's wages. It is a rather common thing for a student to put his room mate's wash in with his own and insist that she do the double wash for the regular price. Other students will insist on having laundry done every other week, for which work they are willing to pay only sixty cents, although the amount of the wash is practically double that of the regular wash for one. Not only because of the fact that she received more for the same amount of labor but also because collections were easier and general relationships more satisfactory she preferred the conditions that existed during the war to any she had ever known.

There are some extraordinary conditions with reference to labor during the war that appear to be definitely shown by the agreement of the opinions expressed by employers and others in the foregoing interviews. Among these are (1) Pronounced shortage of labor, (2) High wages, (3) Inefficiency of both skilled and unskilled labor, (4) Results of high wages, government allotments and other factors in demoralizing labor, (5) Continuance of unsettled labor conditions since the close of the war, (6) Indications that the wage scale will not again entirely return to its former very low level, (7) Tendency of negro labor to organize.

Throughout these interviews there runs the indication as observed by practically every employer interviewed of the tendency of the ne-

gro to work just as little as possible, realizing as he did that his services were at the highest possible premium. This is what may be included under the terms, inefficiency or comparative idleness of laborers. It is not idleness as it is construed by the law, for that is synonymous with vagrancy. Most of these inefficient laborers referred to in the interviews had places as workers, even though they complied rather with the letter than the spirit of the "Work or Fight" law. The matter of pure vagrancy will be taken up in the second part of this chapter under the consideration of the "Work or Fight" law.

2. Enforcement of the "Work or Fight" Law

Very soon after the promulgation by Provost Marshal Crowder of the "Work or Fight" order, many of the individual states in the Union passed laws to re-inforce and make more specific the spirit of that regulation. A Georgia law of this kind was passed at the subsequent session of the General Assembly of the state, the act bearing as its date of approval by the General Assembly August 6, 1918.¹

In order to understand more clearly the relationship of this law to the other laws of the state of a similar nature it must be remembered that the purpose of this law was to intensify and make more definite the laws against vagrancy. A brief reference to the history of anti-vagrancy laws in Georgia is necessary to clarify this statement. The enactment of laws against vagrancy began in Georgia as early as the close of the Civil War, the first act having been passed in 1865. "So serious became the problem of vagrancy and the insolence of the negroes that Georgia, along with the other Southern states, adopted certain restrictive laws, which the times seemed to demand."²

In the following year, 1866, another law of this kind was passed, this law, with the one enacted the preceding year, forming the basis of all subsequent anti-vagrancy law in Georgia. Reference to the Code of Georgia shows that the subsequent acts, either reinforcing or enlarging the scope of those original laws, were passed in 1876, 1895, 1903, 1905. The act of the General Assembly of 1918 forms, therefore, the most recent link in this chain of anti-vagrancy legislation. The gist of this legislation from the initial act of 1865 to the act of 1905 is given in the Code of Georgia, edition of 1910, in Section 449 under the title "Vagrancy Defined." According to this section of the Code, the basic idea of vagrancy is the failure to work of certain classes of people who possess no "visible or known means of a fair, honest and reputable livelihood," which is explained in the law as meaning "reasonably continuous employment at some lawful occupation for reasonable compensation, or a fixed and regular income from property or other investment, which income is sufficient for the support and mainten-

¹ Statute Laws of Georgia, 1918.

² Brooks, R. P. *History of Georgia*, p. 325.

ance of such vagrant." Among the classes of vagrants mentioned are people living in idleness, those leading an immoral or profligate life, those who live by stealing or by trading or bartering stolen goods, professional gamblers, able-bodied beggars, and persons who hire out their minor children and who live on the wages of such children. Sixteen years is the lower age limit, but no upper limit is designated. Students are exempted. It is incumbent upon all town, city and state officials to investigate and prosecute all persons who violate the law. Any person who violates the law is guilty of a misdemeanor and is to be punished in accordance with that section of the Code which fixes the penalty for a misdemeanor.

In contrast with the requirements of the foregoing law the state legislation of 1918, known as the "Work or Fight" law, was purely a war measure. The act of 1918 was drafted with the purpose of placing upon the statutes a stringent but impartial supplementary law that would cause all able-bodied persons, within certain limits, to work. According to this law, the possession of money, property or income sufficient for one's support and the support of those dependent upon one was no defence in case of prosecution. Sixteen and fifty-five years were the lower and upper age limits, respectively. The work in which one was engaged must be an "essential industry," as this term was defined in the Provost Marshal General's order. Five and one-half days per week, with the number of hours of work customary for the industry concerned, was the amount of work required. Inability to obtain work was no excuse, unless the State Commissioner of Commerce and Labor was unable to secure work for an applicant, it being the duty of said Commissioner to supply work to an applicant under the law. The manner of the enforcement of the law, the penalty attached to violations of it, and the other requirements and conditions were essentially the same as those of the vagrancy laws. The law automatically became null and void as soon as the war closed.

An examination of the foregoing summary and contrast of these laws of Georgia will show that the "Work or Fight" law differs from the others in that possession of property or income is no defence under its terms. It was aimed not only at the idle poor but also at the idle well-to-do. Its fundamental purpose was to exact regular work during the war from every one, both rich and poor, who was able to work. Its aim was impartial, and a reference to the docket of the police court of Athens shows that it was impartially enforced. There are comparatively few cases on record of violations during the war of either the "Work or Fight" law or the vagrancy law. The violators of these laws, however, include offenders not only of the wealthy but also of the poorer class, both black and white. More than one well-to-do white resident of Athens was forced to enter some essential industry, as the police record shows.

While there were several of these violators, both black and white, of the requirements of the "Work or Fight" law, whose cases never came to trial but who yielded promptly to the compulsion of the police official and entered essential industries, yet the heart of the matter is not there but in the consideration of the violations of the vagrancy law as these violations may be traced for several years. A gratifying feature of this record is that there were very few cases of vagrancy against the blacks. This statement is not a contradiction of the truth brought out in the first part of this chapter, where it was shown in more than one interview that both skilled and unskilled negro laborers were hard to manage during the war and that they did as little work as possible. It is merely a statement, the proof of which is to be given more fully, that there were few cases of actual vagrancy, by which is meant vicious idleness and refusal to work at all. There were undoubtedly cases, in some instances probably numerous cases, where negroes violated both the letter and the spirit of the "Work or Fight" law, but the reference now is to vagrancy.

TABLE XVII¹.

Showing Annual Decrease in Number of Cases of Negro Vagrancy

Year	Number of Cases	Percentage of Decrease
1916	22	
1917	13	40.91
1918	6	53.85

No white cases are included in the above table because during the entire three years noted there is but one case of vagrancy against the whites, according to the police court records, that case being of a woman of ill repute. The foregoing table includes only what are known as "stockade cases," the figures having been secured from the police court docket of the city of Athens. By stockade cases are meant cases of vagrancy in which the persons concerned were arrested, convicted and sentenced, as is usual in such cases, to the city stockade, or workhouse. There were numerous other cases that were entered upon the docket, but the records show that there were no convictions in these cases. The records are, of course, for the city of Athens only. No other part of Clarke County is included, but it is nevertheless true that these statistics are still valid; because by far the larger number of cases of actual vagrancy are found among the negroes in the cities rather than in the rural districts.

It will be seen from the table that the decrease in negro vagrancy during the year 1917 amounted to 40.91 per cent. there being but two more than half the number of cases for 1917 as there were for the preceding year. The ratio of decrease is maintained and is even accelerated for the year 1918 during the most critical period

¹ Statistics in this table were secured from the **Police Court Docket** of the city of Athens.

of the war. In that year there were only six cases of negro vagrancy as compared with twelve for the preceding year. This record is indeed an unusual one for a city of 6,316 negro population, and the explanation of it is interesting.

It has been the plan of the Athens police force for a number of years to stop crime by prohibiting idleness. It is the belief of the officials on the police force, a belief that is in thorough harmony with well established facts in the study of the negro problem, that idleness is a fruitful source of crime. With this belief in mind, it has been the aim of the police department to prevent vagrancy and even to compel the negroes to notify the department in advance of the time and place of each negro frolic, such as "mullet suppers" and similar functions. In this way much has been accomplished not only in the reduction of vagrancy but also in the decrease of negro crime generally. The statistics given in Table XVII show this conclusively.

In more thoroughly enforcing the conditions of the "Work or Fight" law as it served to make more stringent the provisions of the original vagrancy laws the Athens police department made use of a simple device in the form of a card system. This was used particularly among negroes and those whose employments could not be readily traced by means of their offices, the city directory, or other such devices. The card certificate, with its simple lettering and marginal date arrangement is illustrated below:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.	1918		THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT																				1920		July					
Feb.			-----																				August							
March			Is employed by me, and that he was engaged in a																				Sept.							
April			USEFUL OCCUPATION																				Oct.							
May			on the dates punched in the margin.																				Nov.							
June	1919		-----																				1921		Dec.					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

It is the opinion of a well known police official of Athens, a man who has been connected with the force for a period of fourteen years, that the negroes of Athens, and also of the county generally as far as he had come in contact with them, had realized their responsibility during the war and had proved themselves in the main as law-abiding citizens. He knew of no insolence from negro sol-

diers, and these soldiers had usually upon their return home from army service gone back to work promptly. He knew personally of one negro who, having arrived one day with his discharge from the army, had gone back to work the following day. He was of the opinion that there were other cases of this kind.

What is most notable about the rapidly decreasing number of cases of vagrancy in Athens is that it was brought about as effectively before the passage of the "Work or Fight" law as it was afterwards. With the exception of reaching those who have property or incomes and who for this reason would not work, it appears that the "Work or Fight" law was hardly needed in Clarke County or in Georgia, if the long-existent vagrancy laws were enforced. Both the Athens police force and the negroes of Athens deserve credit for this commendable state of affairs here. In fact, the very small percentage of vagrancy here during the critical year of the Great War and throughout the course of that memorable struggle is a most creditable showing for the negroes of Clarke County, a manifestation of patriotism and practical helpfulness that is probably not surpassed by that of any county in the state with a negro population of like size.

CHAPTER VI.

WHAT BECAME OF THE NEGRO'S WAR PROFITS?

Since the preceding part of this study, especially Chapter V, has made clear that the negro has reaped unusual profits from war conditions, it is but natural to make the inquiry, "What became of the profits?" It will be the purpose of this concluding chapter to give to this question as definite and as comprehensive an answer as possible.

Among other inquiries that suggest themselves as related to the main question as it is presented in the foregoing paragraph are the following ones: "Did the negro invest any of his surplus money wisely?" "If so, how much?" "Did he spend the greater or the lesser part of it with poor judgment?" "In what ways did he find it most agreeable to spend his war profits?" These and similar queries will serve to show the scope of the present chapter of this study.

What the average negro family of Athens and Clarke County does with its income in normal times will have much to do in making clear what these negroes did under the stimulus of war-time wages and the reception of allotments that were in most cases like gifts out of the blue sky. It is fortunate that this phase of negro life in Athens, at least, received thorough investigation before the beginning of the Great War. Such an investigation formed the basis of the Phelps-Stokes Fellowship Studies, No. 1, which was completed about the close of the spring season in 1913, more than a year before the Great War began. In this former study Mr. T. J. Woofter, Jr., made a careful and extended investigation of the expenditures of negro families, the results of which form the matter of an entire chapter in his study. The vital truths revealed by this investigation will first be summarized, and the results of the present investigation will be added to them.

In his inquiries into the expenditures of 184 negro families Mr. Woofter arrived at, among others, the following conclusions: "The average expenditure for miscellaneous items (items not including food, clothing, lodging, and fuel) is 53 per cent of the total outlay. The percentage of the total income spent for miscellaneous items rises with much more rapidity than the income. If this miscellaneous expenditure were saved, or spent for such laudable wants as education, furniture and books, it might be to the negro's advantage that his actual expenditure is only half his income. Such, however, is not the case. Agents, saloons, and instalment dealers cater to negro trade with the view of getting this extra money, and, except in cases of exceptional thrift, they succeed. Instead of better furniture, cheap prints, organs, and bric-a-brac are too often purchased; and instead of better clothing a surplus of wages over expenditures goes, too often, for gaudy ornaments.

"The fact that the negro can live off of the fruits of three days' labor, and, if so minded, can rest the other three days, is emphasized by the fact that half of the income of the negro goes for incidentals, while the items of food, shelter, cleanliness, and self-improvement receive the slightest possible attention. The fallacy that higher wages would make the negro a better workman has been disproved by his tendency to spend for unnecessary articles all over and above a certain percentage of his income."

This fallacy, disproved very conclusively by the former investigation, is made even more manifest by the inquiries that have been made recently in order to secure the material used in this study. As the buying of land represents probably the sanest and most permanently helpful material investment that an agricultural people like the negroes could make with their profits, it will be used as the type of the wise investment. As the automobile probably more than any other one thing symbolizes for the average citizen, particularly so for the negro, unnecessary expenditure and a tendency toward luxurious living, it will be used as the type of the unwise investment. This summarizes the matter in such a way that it may be examined in this introductory analysis in the form of a contrast, the first part of which is the consideration of the changes from year to year in the acreage of land owned by whites and blacks.

TABLE XVIII.¹

Showing Ownership of Land by Whites and Blacks, with Increase or Decrease

					Increase or Decrease
White					
1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1914-18
60949.25	60889.75	61947	61720.25	61447.50	+498.25
Increase or Decrease					
	-0.10	+1.74	-0.36	-0.44	
Black					
8537.62	8306.75	8335	8470.37	9024.50	+486.88
Increase or Decrease					
	-2.46	+0.34	+1.62	+6.54	

Though the specific causes for each change shown in the foregoing table may be hard to find, nevertheless the general principles controlling these changes are fairly manifest. It must be remembered that the giving in of land values to the receiver of tax returns is a thing that is inevitably more or less irregular, even though land, unlike some other kinds of property, jewelry, for instance, cannot be hidden. It is, therefore, necessary to find a very sharp and decisive tendency, either an increase or a decrease in

¹ Land acreage statistics in this table were obtained from the **Clarke County Tax Digest** for 1918.

acreage, before one can be sure that any very unusual cause has been operative. The general tendencies in land fluctuations here shown are easily seen. In the case of the whites a gradual but continuous increase is evident. With reference to the negroes a general increase is almost equally apparent.

An examination of these statistics reveals a series of fluctuations in each division of the table, that devoted to the white acreage and that devoted to the black. Sometimes the change is an increase, sometimes it is a decrease. The total increase in acreage for the whites during the five-year period studied is 498.25 acres. The total increase in acreage for the blacks for the same period is 486.88. How nearly identical the increase in acreage is for each race is clearly shown in these figures. The only instances of what may be termed comparatively large increases are, for the whites, in the acreage of 1916, which shows a gain of 1,057.25 acres, and, for the blacks, in the acreage of 1918, which indicates a gain of 554.12 acres. The acreage for the whites in 1918 shows not an increase but a decrease of 272.75 acres.

An increase in negro lands of 554.12 acres for 1918 over 1917, in conjunction with a decrease of 135.37 acres for 1917 in comparison with 1916, has considerable significance. It means that the negroes spent some part of their war profits for land, but not a very large part. It is a regrettable fact that they did not spend more of their war earnings for permanent economic improvement of this kind. Though most of this acreage is in farm land, yet more than the ordinary proportion of the increase is in city lots, as the sales-records of the Athens real estate dealers show. The increased acreage in negro land, however, is on the economic side one of the most hopeful features of negro life in Clarke County during the Great War.

Though the increased acreage in negro lands for 1918 is rather notable, a much sharper contrast is found in the consideration of the tax valuations on the automobile, which is employed here as the type of the unwise expenditure.

TABLE XIX.¹

Showing Increase in Tax Valuation of Automobiles, Motorcycles, Etc.

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
White - -	\$80,885	\$99,955	\$118,770	\$148,795	\$194,690	\$257,450
Black - -	400	1,300	1,400	3,000	4,990	14,875

TABLE XX.

Showing Percentage of Increase Over Previous Year

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
White - -		23.57	18.82	25.28	30.84	32.24
Black - -		225.00	7.69	114.28	66.33	198.09

Although motorcycles and bicycles are included with automobiles in these statistics as they are found on the Tax Digest, nevertheless

¹ Tax Digest, Clarke County, 1918.

the figures are substantially true for automobiles alone; because the value of these other vehicles as compared with that of automobiles is practically nothing. These tables form a good index to the unwise investments made by the negroes, for there is a striking contrast between the war purchases of automobiles by whites and blacks, if the Tax Digest may be considered an accurate index of such conditions. The annual increase in the valuation of automobiles of the whites is very steady and gradual. The increase for the year 1918, being only 1.40 per cent over the increase for the preceding year. On the other hand, the increase in valuation of automobiles owned by negroes is, for the year 1918, 121.76 per cent over that for 1917. In the main year of the war, when Athens automobile dealers and owners reported hardly the usual activity in the sale of cars to whites, more cars were sold to negroes than had ever been known. This means that the negroes of the county in that year found sufficient money available from their war profits to invest approximately \$10,000 in automobiles when it was difficult to get them to invest anything in Liberty Loans and other war activities, their total paid subscriptions to all the war activity campaigns being less than \$5,000.

But this is not all. It was only the fact that the negroes could not conveniently get the low-priced automobile they prefer that prevented them from buying many more cars. The Athens agent for the most popular car among the negroes said, in speaking of the sale of these cars during the war period, that his firm could not begin to supply the demand for these cars after the factory discontinued making them. The negroes who wanted cars, however, were not to be disappointed. They inquired concerning owners of second-hand cars of this make, and the sale of these second-hand cars here from their owners to negroes was unprecedented. Every second-hand car of this kind that could be secured was bought by negroes. Many of the negroes who could not secure new cars of the popular make they like strained every point they could, if necessary, and bought higher-priced cars. The sale of these higher-priced cars here to negroes during the war was the largest on record. In view of these facts, it appears plain that the negro eagerly and lavishly spent his war profits for automobiles.

So goes the record not only with reference to automobiles but also as regards silverware, jewelry, furniture, food, clothing, fire-arms, and every other kindred phase of expenditure. It is not the mere fact that the negroes spent their war profits for these articles that is being recorded and emphasized here in connection with this study but the far more significant fact that they spent their money with very poor judgment. As a careful and experienced student of the economics of the Georgia negro has observed: "It is painful to have to record the fact that on the whole the negroes seem not to have used their high profits wisely. Never before have merchants

sold negroes so many fine clothes, shoes, and firearms; never before have they spent so much money in traveling about aimlessly; never before have they bought such expensive and luxurious articles of food. Many thousands have bought automobiles. High wages on the farm and in the towns have encouraged the negro's natural tendency to idleness."¹

If one wishes to investigate these unwise expenditures of the Clarke County negro, he has but to make a brief tour of the shops of the representative merchants of Athens. The evidence given by these merchants on this point is positive and unanimous. In a few interviews that are given here as personal evidence of this fact it will be seen how the merchants with whom the negroes of the county do their trading regard the expenditures of the negroes for these various articles not only during war-time but also since the war has closed, for invariably these merchants record the fact that the negroes are continuing in time of peace the unusually extravagant buying which characterized them in time of war.

Dealers in jewelry, firearms, clothing, groceries and furniture were selected for these interviews. In several cases it will be observed that the merchant has pointed out the fact that the negro has spent his money, or has shown the desire to do so, for articles much more expensive than would have served his purpose, or even for things that were useless.

A. A prominent jeweler, whose white and black customers come to him not only from Athens but also from places within a radius of fifty miles, said that he could easily see during the war the increase in negro trade in jewelry and similar wares but that he would not like to attempt to state it in figures. It was "readily perceptible," even "considerable," he said. In this particular he referred definitely to the sale of goods to negro farmers who had sold their cotton and to negro women and other negroes, where he knew from the vouchers presented that the money came from government allotments. As there is always a substantial white trade in jewelry in autumn, the unusual sales of such goods to negro farmers and to negroes who were evidently spending money paid them by the government were all the more noticeable. The trade conditions were attributed by the merchant to two main causes; first, the high price of cotton, which sold, during the most lively period of the country trade as high as 35 cents per pound; second, to the presence of ready money in the way of allotments and other funds from soldiers. The first of these causes was, in his opinion, the more powerful of the two, though the latter had a perceptible effect upon the pulse of trade. These causes operated in the very nature of things to increase the trade of both races, though the increased buying noted in the case of the blacks was even more perceptible than that of the whites.

B. As was true of the most popular kind of automobile, the demand for firearms in general was far beyond the supply. This fact is vouched for by an official of one of the largest hardware companies in Athens. This dealer says he could have sold firearms of the very best kind in almost unlimited quantities to negroes but

¹ Brooks, R. P. *Effects of the Great War on Agriculture in Georgia*, Proceedings of the Georgia Historical Association, 1919.

that the factories were so busy with government contracts that firearms on other orders could not be secured from them. As it was, the negroes bought all the firearms they could get.

C. An example of extravagance in clothing was cited by a large clothing dealer, who said that he had never before sold so large a number of silk shirts to negroes as during the war. White men with similar incomes would not have thought of buying silk shirts. Many negroes who had formerly bought only cotton shirts bought silk ones instead. Negroes had also bought much more largely than ever the highest-priced suits of clothes, shoes and other furnishings.

D. Grocers invariably report unusual sales of the finest groceries and of many foods not usually bought by the negroes. According to one of the proprietors of a large grocery store, whose stock is of the finest and most expensive kind, the increase in grocery expenditures among his negro customers, after allowing for the increase in the price of groceries and of the increased cost of living generally, was from 10 to 15 per cent. This is just as true now, five months after the close of the war, as it was during the war. His negro customers now invariably demand only fancy groceries of the very best brands he has. A negro customer who would formerly buy a cheap grade of flour, or haggle very much about paying the difference between the cheaper grade and the better, now asks for the best grade of fancy flour and pays for it without hesitancy. He knows the same thing to be true about not only other groceries but also with reference to meats and similar foods.

E. Furniture dealers report not only larger sales but also finer grades of their stock sold to negroes than ever. An increase in the sales of furniture was naturally expected in view of the high price of cotton and other farm products, but the very expensive grades of furniture and kindred articles of house furnishings bought by the negroes during the war surprised even the dealers in these goods. So also did the amount of cash the negroes had, many negroes having often paid cash for their entire large bills of goods. One of the best and largest furniture merchants in Athens estimates that his negro customers as a whole paid four times as much cash on their bills during the war as they ordinarily do. Their instalments, where they bought on the extended payment plan, have been met more regularly than the furniture dealers have ever known. Though in the case of the dealers who sell the higher grades of furniture the number of sales has not largely increased, yet the increase in these sales in dollars and cents is estimated by one dealer conservatively at 200 per cent. For instance, a customer, a negro woman, entered his store and asked to see some chairs. The clerk showed her a set of substantial chairs, with cane bottoms, that retailed at fifty cents apiece. The negro asked to see others and finally bought a set of dainty mahogany chairs at five dollars apiece, paying cash for the entire set. This was cited by the dealer as an example of waste of money, because the mahogany chairs were too frail to stand the service they would be subjected to in the negro's home. Many other instances of this lavish and unwise expenditure of money by the negroes were pointed out, such as the buying by the negro trading public of five times as many talking-machines as ordinarily, these being of an exceptionally expensive type. Negroes who ordinarily pay eight or ten dollars for a trunk did not hesitate to pay twenty to fifty dollars. Those who usually spent ten or fifteen dollars for a bed were not content to buy one for less than twenty to thirty dollars. Similar extravagance was shown with reference to rugs, pictures, china, bric-a-brac, and other articles.

It appears that the answer to the question, "What became of the negro's war profits?" has been given rather completely in this chapter. It seems very certain from what has been shown that the negro spent the lesser part of these profits for essentials and the larger part for non-essentials, or what the former Phelps-Stokes Study termed "miscellaneous items." During his heyday of prosperity in the Great War the negro seems to have been attracted, as is usual with him in time of prosperity, more by the superficialities, the tinsel and glitter of life, than by its permanent benefits and durable satisfactions. It is unfortunately true that he used the greater part of his war profits for unworthy ends.

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